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NONPARTISAN CIVIC POLITICS
IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES

by



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A THESIS

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and
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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study was to provide an account of nonpartisan civic politics in Canada and the United States through a critical review of the literature. A typology was developed which divided civic politics into partisan and nonpartisan categories. The typology also distinguished between the degrees of nonpartisan politics, according to the degree to which specified political party functions were performed in the electoral and legislative arenas. The main body of the study consisted of a historical and descriptive account of nonpartisanship in Canada and the United States. The origin, development and persistence of the ideology of nonpartisanship and the institutional correlates of this ideology were studied in both countries. Finally, a brief examination of some of the hypothesized effects of nonpartisanship selected from the recent social science literature was undertaken, followed by a concluding chapter summarizing the material covered in the thesis and indicating avenues for further research.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to provide an account of nonpartisan civic politics in Canada and the United States through a critical review of the literature. A conceptual framework will be developed which will distinguish between partisan and nonpartisan local politics. This framework will also distinguish between degrees of nonpartisanship on the basis of the degree to which specified political party functions are performed in various communities. The main body of the thesis will consist of a historical and descriptive account of municipal nonpartisanship in the United States and Canada. The origin, development and persistence of the nonpartisan ideology as well as the institutional correlates of this ideology will be examined in both countries. Finally, a brief critical examination of the hypothesized effects of nonpartisan politics as posited in the literature will be undertaken, followed by a concluding chapter which will summarize the material covered in the thesis and indicate avenues for further research.

In this chapter, an attempt will be made to delineate a useful conception of the notions of "partisan" and "nonpartisan" based to a degree on their usage in literature. The

initial task of the chapter will be to clarify the various meanings that have been attached to the term and then to develop categories which will be useful in conceptualizing nonpartisan local politics. It might be helpful to begin by distinguishing between nonpartisanship and two terms with which it is sometimes confused--i.e. "bipartisanship" and "monopartisanship" (or one-party politics). Firstly, nonpartisan politics must be distinguished from "bipartisanship". Charles Adrian points out that "journalists, public officials and citizens sometimes say "nonpartisan" when a political scientist would say "bipartisan".¹ This is done, for example, in reference to a commission or committee made up of two parties, or a slate-making group may claim to be nonpartisan on the grounds that its candidates are affiliated with both major parties.² Secondly, it is helpful to clear up the confusion between one-party politics ("monopartisanship") and nonpartisanship. V.O. Key, for example, refers to the one-party dominance in the Southern United States as "quasinonpartisanship".³ One-party politics, however, is partisan according to the definition which will be developed here in that it involves legislative control by a group which overtly runs candidates, enunciates a program and exercises party unit in the policy-making process. Robert Wood suggests another reason--associated with accountability--which has become a pervasive theme in the literature; he states, "where party politics exist, even if predominantly one-party politics, there are . . .

party organizations which in the end, and, if the situation becomes too outrageous, may be held accountable."⁴

A further meaning of the term which is legitimate in another context may be dispensed with for the purposes of conceptualizing effectively partisan and nonpartisan urban systems. This is the meaning which equates nonpartisanship with the form of ballot on which party designation of candidates does not appear. In Canada, where the party affiliation of local candidates is virtually never printed on the ballot, this definition is not meaningful and in the United States, the nonpartisan ballot denotes only a formal characteristic of elections. Defining nonpartisanship in this legal and formal manner does not necessarily reflect the reality of the political process that may occur beneath the facade of the nonpartisan ballot. It does not exclude the possibility of effectively partisan politics in which a party may continue to run candidates, campaign, and if elected to a majority of seats, structure the policy-making of the council by bloc-voting. Chicago is an example of a city with partisan politics in spite of a nonpartisan ballot--as are most British local councils. This is not to deny that the absence of the party label on the ballot has not contributed to nonpartisan local politics. Indeed, in the United States, the removal of the party label from the traditionally "long" ballot has probably made it more difficult for parties to capture urban councils because it has removed the perceptual cue that would otherwise

guide the voter to structure his vote on partisan lines.⁵

Having stated what nonpartisan local politics is not, the next and more important task is to attempt to develop a workable notion of what it is--in the context of this study. The rationale which will guide this conceptualization of local nonpartisanship will be that the categories should be: a) useful as a framework for understanding the literature on the subject and b) that these categories should correspond as closely as possible to the political reality of local politics in Canada and the United States. To this end, two prominent typologies of nonpartisan local elections appearing in the literature will be explicated. The first was developed by Charles Adrian in 1959 in connection with American civic politics,⁶ the second, more recent and more relevant to this study, was developed by Harold Kaplan in a Canadian context.⁷ A conceptual framework based to some degree on Kaplan's categorization will then be explicated and will become the definition which will guide the inquiry in the rest of the thesis. It is important to note that in all three of these typologies nonpartisanship is defined in terms of the opposite type of politics--partisanship. In other words, nonpartisan politics is most effectively defined in contrast to partisanship. The very term suggests this approach--the prefix "non" indicating the absence of partisanship--i.e., that which is "not" partisanship is nonpartisanship. To define partisan politics, then, is to imply that other types of local politics not

falling into this category is "non"-partisan. The nonpartisan category can then be subdivided into degrees of nonpartisanship, depending upon whether certain political party functions are performed in the communities to be studied.

The first typology to be examined appeared in 1959 in the form of an article written by Charles Adrian entitled "A Typology of Nonpartisan Elections".⁸ He defines nonpartisan elections as those in which party affiliations are not printed on the ballot but he emphasizes that a variety of political activity including effectively partisan politics takes place in formally nonpartisan cities:

a) Adrian's first category (Type I) is the effectively partisan election in which "the only candidates who normally have a chance of being elected are those who are supported directly by a major political party organization."⁹

b) Of the three types of effectively nonpartisan elections, the first type (Adrian's Type II) is defined as "elections where slates of candidates are supported by various groups, including political party organizations."¹⁰ Adrian implies that these slates of candidates, however, do not exercise group cohesiveness in council. The parties and groups offer slates of candidates but do not normally demand disciplined voting once the slates are elected to council.

c) The second type of effectively nonpartisan election

(Adrian's Type III) is described as "elections where slates of candidates are supported by various interest groups, but political party organizations have little or no part in campaigns, or are active only sporadically."¹¹ This category is, in effect, a second type of "slate" politics which, since party or slate unity in the policy-making process of council is apparently not practiced, is not (for purposes of this paper) essentially different from Type II.

d) Adrian's Type IV which is essentially his third nonpartisan category is characterized by "elections where neither political parties nor slates of candidates are important in campaigns."¹² In this type of election, the candidate is a self starter who builds his own ad hoc electoral organization and directs his own campaign.

Despite the fact that Adrian's typology has served as a model in other studies on United States civic elections,¹³ it does not serve the purposes of this work and is therefore not adopted here. It deals only with elections that take place where a nonpartisan ballot is used. Yet the partisan ballot is still used in a significant number of United States cities and Adrian tells us nothing about the party activities or lack of them in these cities. Secondly, Adrian does not explicitly go beyond electoral politics to categorize the politics of the council. An important feature which sets non-partisanship off from partisanship for the purposes of

conceptualization in this study is whether or not an overtly partisan group with a majority position on council exercises party unit in the policy-making process.

A more recent typology and one more suitable for the purposes of this study has been outlined by Harold Kaplan in his book, Urban Political Systems: A Functional Analysis of Metro Toronto, written in 1967.¹⁴ Kaplan's typology, unlike Adrian's, explicitly extends nonpartisanship and partisanship to include electoral as well as legislative (i.e. council) politics. He provides a key distinction between partisan and nonpartisan local politics--a partisan system being one in which council policy-making is structured by an organization which nominates candidates, espouses a program, and votes as a bloc on council. Kaplan's typology, it will be seen, does not suggest sufficient conditions for partisanship and nonpartisanship. His categories, however, will form the basis upon which the definitions of partisanship and nonpartisanship will be built. The final form of the definition which will be used throughout the study will be elaborated after Kaplan's typology has been reviewed and evaluated.

Although Kaplan's typology of partisanship/nonpartisanship is presented as a way of categorizing elections, he associates several types of council or legislative behavior with each of his three types of elections. He maintains that the most useful way to classify local elections in North

America is to place them on a structured-unstructured continuum:

Where parties or ad hoc electoral alliances prepare slates or tickets to guide the voter in his selection, that election may be classified as relatively structured. Unstructured elections exist where no bracketing or grouping of candidates occurs, where party or factional labels are missing, and where each candidate runs his own separate campaign.¹⁵

He specifically divides his continuum into component activities and derives three "ideal types" of electoral politics--partisan, factional and nonfactional. These types are elaborated as follows:

a) The partisan category is the most "structured" form of local politics. Specifically, "the common feature of all partisan elections is that stable, enduring organizations try to win control of city government and to maintain some degree of party unity in the policy-making process."¹⁶

b) The next most "structured" type of politics is the factional category. "A Faction will be defined as an electoral alliance that dissolves once the election is over. Factional cities have slates of candidates in local elections but do not have disciplined voting in the council."¹⁷ He explains further that although this electoral type might produce a majority of one slate in the legislature, it does not produce a cohesive bloc. "The elections are structured, through the use of labels and the grouping of candidates' names on the

ballot, but the politics of the municipal council . . . is not structured."¹⁸

c) the least structured category of municipal electoral politics, the type which appears on the "unstructured" end of the continuum, is the "nonfactional" type. No "factions" or parties are active here. "Each candidate runs his own campaign, refuses to attach any labels to his name, and refuses to link his name with any other candidates running for different offices."¹⁹ Kaplan does not tell us explicitly, but it seems clear that the legislative politics resulting from this type would not be structured--i.e., normally, stable enduring groups attempting to control the policy-making of council would not be in evidence.

The strengths and weaknesses of Kaplan's typology will now be evaluated with a view to building upon it to formulate categories more useful to an understanding of the literature reviewed in this study. It is important to note that typologies are useful insofar as they are "instrumental in the research process." As John T. Toby has pointed out in his book, An Introduction to Social Research, typification "involves disregarding those individual differences of the typified objects" which are not "relevant to the particular purpose at hand for which the type has been formed."²⁰ Although the typology to be elaborated in a sense consists of ideal types, it is developed with a view to categorizing as carefully as

possible phenomena in the real world. It is, as Toby indicates, too much to expect that every particular phenomenon in the area to be studied will fit neatly into each type or category. The purpose of the specific typology to be developed here is, as Toby suggests, useful in that it allows the researcher "cognitively to map broad areas of social phenomena through the systematic tapping of historical and secondary data."²¹

Kaplan's typology has a number of weaknesses which preclude its adoption in toto for this study. It does not, for example, sufficiently categorize the legislative sphere although it goes further than Adrian's typology in that it recognizes some of the differences in legislative behavior which may result from different types of electoral activity. Kaplan tells us that in partisan systems "organizations try to win control of city government and to maintain some degree of party unity in the policy-making process."²² He does not tell us, however, if these groups indeed succeed in controlling government. This would be the case if a group actually obtained a majority on council and exercised party unity in the policy-making process. The importance of this criteria for the city is suggested by Eulau and Eyestone, who state that "decision-making by legislative bodies is a collective act. The council . . . under the majority principle is the effective policy-maker."

Moreover, Kaplan states that in a partisan system, "organizations try to . . . maintain . . . party unity in the policy making process."²³ It seems of importance to know whether or not they do indeed succeed in establishing this party unity because even a majority party cannot "control" a legislative body in the fullest sense if its factionalized voting patterns frustrates any consistent majority vote.

Kaplan's "nonfactional" category is defined as a system in which "factions" or parties do not compete in elections. He does not tell us what the legislative type is in this system. It is conceivable that a bloc of like-minded legislators could form a majority group on council and maintain a high degree of unity in policy-formation even though there was no group activity in the electoral sphere. In such a situation, the politics of council would be similar to the type in which an electoral alliance campaigns as a group on a particular platform, captures a majority position on council and acts as a bloc. However, a key distinction that Kaplan's schema does not provide for it the element of responsibility or accountability tied to the overtly partisan group. Much of the literature on nonpartisanship is concerned with the implied accountability of parties or slates that campaign openly on the basis of issues and maintain group unity in the policy-making sphere.²⁴

A further weakness with his typology is that it does

not explicitly take care of the type of politics characterized by intra-party factions which in "one-party" cities may be the most meaningful style of electoral politics. Especially since he employs the terms "factional" and "nonfactional" it would appear incumbent upon him to make this distinction. This confusion of terms will be cleared up in the typology developed below.

Expanding upon the strengths of Kaplan's schema, a typology can be developed that will allow the types of political phenomena mentioned above to be brought within the conceptual framework. The value of Kaplan's model lies in the fact that it conceptualizes various degrees of partisanship/nonpartisanship depending upon the party-like functions performed in the electoral and legislative spheres. This corresponds to political reality since, in different local political systems, party-like activity such as nominating candidates, campaigning on the basis of a legislative program and exercising group cohesiveness in council voting may all be done or may not be done at all, or, lastly, some of these factors might be evident while others are not.

At this point it is possible to elaborate upon Kaplan's typology to develop a more precise and more useful schema for use in this work. As indicated above, Kaplan does not specify the sufficient conditions for partisanship. He maintains that a partisan system of local politics prevails when "stable,

enduring organizations try to win control of city government and to maintain some degree of party unity in the policy making process."²⁵ The definition which will be adopted here, however, will define partisanship as a form of politics characterized by organizations which nominate candidates, campaign on the basis of particular policy commitments and one in which one of these groups captures a majority position on council where it maintains group or party unity in the policy-making process. Moreover, these groups must carry out these activities overtly. This latter condition provides for the element of accountability which is in theory more applicable to organizations which are overt rather than clandestine and whose policies are publicized prior to the election.²⁶

The notion of accountability is also linked with this typology in that one of the groups must not only comprise the majority on council but must also exercise a considerable degree of party cohesiveness in council decision-making. If these conditions are met, then, in theory, the voter can more readily identify the group responsible for civic policies and call this group to account at the next election if he is dissatisfied. The December, 1969, election in Toronto provides a good example of the importance of the "majority" criterion. In that election two major parties nominated candidates, campaigned on the basis of comprehensive policies, and each elected some members to council where they presumably exercise bloc voting. However, since neither party attained a majority

position on council,²⁷ each party can claim in the next campaign that their policies were thwarted by the majority on council and neither can readily be held accountable for the implementation or nonimplementation of its respective program.

A further criterion that must be emphasized in the definition of partisanship is the cohesiveness of a party or group which has (a) nominated candidates and (b) publicly campaigned as a group on the basis of certain policy commitments. Even if a majority group is present in a council, it may be hampered by intra-group factionalism to such an extent that it cannot maintain bloc voting on most decisions. A similar category would be the case where an electoral alliance exists only for campaign purposes and votes as individuals when elected to council. In cases such as the two just mentioned, each candidate in the group can excuse himself from responsibility for many adverse policy decisions on the grounds that he as an individual or as a member of a minority faction was out-voted by a majority on council. Such situations, then, do not make the council politics "partisan". To summarize, partisan local politics prevail in a council in which there exists (a) an acknowledged majority group which has (b) publicly campaigned as a group on a common program and (c) which has nominated candidates who are overtly identified with the particular organization and its policies.

The "nonpartisan" category to be used in this study

can be described simply as the type of local politics which does not fit the partisan category. More specifically, there are two types of nonpartisan politics, the "factional" and "nonfactional".

The "factional" category can be characterized by somewhat different modes of factionalism which all fall short of the "partisan" category. Firstly, there is the type of local election in which local or national parties and groups may run but none of these electoral alliances obtains a majority. whether or not they maintain bloc voting they cannot automatically control council decision-making under the majority principle and they cannot readily be held accountable as can a majority group. Secondly, even if a group that adheres for electoral purposes should be successful in obtaining a majority of council seats it may have as its policy that each successful candidate vote according to his own views--hence, it would not exercise bloc voting on council decisions. The "majority" criterion here would only apply to the electoral sphere and hence fall short of the partisan category.

Special attention must be given to the explanation of the factional category because in the classical political party literature "faction" often means an intra-party faction. How do intra-party factions fit our schema? There appears to be several ways in which intra-party factionalism would operate in local politics. First, if a party or group coalesced

for nomination purposes and campaigned on the same platform but divided into factions voting differently on policy questions when elected it would fit into either "factional" or "partisan" categories according to our typology. If one faction or party held a majority position on council, the political process would fit the necessary and sufficient conditions for partisanship--i.e., an organization which nominates candidates, campaigns on a common platform and is elected to a majority position on council where it practices bloc voting. If, however, the factionalism of the group was such that it could not consistently form a majority bloc and vote cohesively on most issues then it would fall short of the partisan category and the system would be classified as "factional". Second, if a party was characterized by intra-party factions which campaigned separately as well as voted as factions on council, this situation also could fit either the partisan or factional category depending upon whether a particular faction obtained a majority position on council and whether it exercised disciplined voting. If it did both it would be "partisan"; if neither, the "factional" category would describe this situation.

At this point a legitimate question may be asked of the operation of a faction on council. Suppose, for example, that a minority group or party is elected to council as a group or a group forms after the members are elected and in either case this group exercises cohesive voting on a great

many decisions. Would this not cause the majority of council (who had hitherto voted as individuals in true nonpartisan tradition) to coalesce into a cohesive voting bloc to thwart the threat to council policies by this upstart group whose ideology might well be anathema to the nonpartisan majority? Moreover, would not the consistent bloc voting by a majority of council be identical to that which prevails when a recognized party holds a majority of council positions? The answer, it appears, would be that even though the typically party function is being carried out in the legislative sphere, the party criterion does not apply in the electoral sphere since the nonpartisan majority on council did not nominate candidates as a group on a common platform. In other words the system is still nonpartisan (factional type) although in degree it would approach the partisan category more closely than the "nonfactional" type where groups are absent.²⁸

The second type of nonpartisan politics is the "non-factional" category. Here no groups or parties overtly nominate candidates and there is no overt group or party activity in campaigns. No stable, enduring group characterized by consistently cohesive voting structures the policies of council. Hence there is no significant factionalism. In this category the activities which are characteristically performed by parties are less evident than in those cities where "factions" perform some of the activities of parties.

To summarize the import of the typology, it is evident

that, as with the schemas developed by Adrian and Kaplan, the definition of party and partisanship is the pivotal part of the framework. Party here is defined in terms of its function in the political system and appears to be reasonably consistent with the political party literature--as is evident from V.O. Key's definition of parties as groups which "put forward candidates for office, advocate particular courses of governmental action, and if their candidates win a majority, create enough of a sense of joint responsibility . . . to aid them in the fulfillment of a group responsibility for the direction of government."²⁷ The key distinction between partisan and nonpartisan local politics, then, is that the former involves overt majority group cohesiveness in council decision-making by the majority party whereas the latter lacks this element of implied responsibility by any particular group on council for the decisions of the body as a whole. This conceptual framework will be elaborated in the following chapters as necessary.

It was indicated at the beginning of this introductory chapter that the main body of the thesis would consist of a critical study of the literature to account for the origin, development and persistence of nonpartisanship in the United States and Canada. Similarly, it was stated that somewhat less attention would be devoted to the literature on the hypothesized effects of nonpartisanship. It would appear that a rationale must be given not only for dealing with the

alleged consequences of nonpartisanship last but also for devoting less attention to this body of literature. There are a number of reasons for this approach.

Firstly, an understanding of the ideology of local nonpartisanship as well as the institutional manifestations of this ideology is crucial to an understanding of the alleged effects of nonpartisanship. A historical and descriptive account of the ideology and institutions of nonpartisanship is, in a methodological sense, a prerequisite to an analysis of the consequences of this form of politics. As Lineberry and Fowler have stated, "(I)t is important that we understand the ideology of these reformers if we hope to be able to analyze the institutions which they created and their impact on political decisions."²⁹ Moreover, since no comprehensive account of the ideology and institutions of nonpartisanship in Canada could be found, a synthesis of material from diverse Canadian sources became a necessary and important task. However, the evidence indicated that the tradition of nonpartisan local politics had been imported into Canada largely from the United States. For this reason an extensive account of the origins and development of nonpartisanship in the United States first had to be given because of the pervasive American influence on the origins and growth of this political phenomenon in Canada.

There are, additionally, characteristics of the

literature on the consequences of nonpartisanship which make that body of literature somewhat less than fruitful as a field of empirical research. A number of features of the literature may be cited as evidence of this sterility of empirical import. Generally, there is a paucity of careful research on the topic. For example, Pomper observed in 1966 that "although nonpartisan elections are now employed in almost two-thirds of American municipal elections, only limited analysis has been made of their actual political effect."³⁰ Similarly, Salisbury and Black remark that "the analytic literature examining nonpartisan electoral contests and comparing them with partisan elections is less extensive than the hortatory material."³¹

More specifically, of the two basic traditions in the literature on nonpartisanship, the reformist or "good government" school is restricted largely to a tabulation of the civic victories of the reformers over the party machine³² while the more recent body of political science literature on the subject has been plagued by a number of methodological problems which have limited the results. Of these methodological hurdles, the most serious include: a) the difficulty of isolating the effects of nonpartisanship from that of associated changes that occurred at the same time, such as at-large elections or the change to the city manager form,³³ b) the difficulty of comparing nonpartisan with partisan cities because of the virtual impossibility of finding two or more cities

that are the same in all other relevant respects,³⁴ and c) the difficulty of distinguishing the effects of nonpartisanship from the effects of the forces that led to the removal of parties in the first place.³⁵

The main thrust of the thesis, then, will be concerned with an examination of the genesis of nonpartisanship, with a chronological account of its development at the level of ideology and institutions, and with the factors associated with its continued persistence in various degrees in the cities of Canada and the United States. The existence of the "local political syndrome" which views government at the local level largely as a matter of administration (and hence not a matter for partisan interference) appears to be pervasive in the political culture of the United States and English Canada. It will be seen that this political orientation in part explains the "curious paradox" in the politics of the two countries--i.e., that political parties are apparently necessary and legitimate at the senior levels of government but not at the local level. This and other elements in the nonpartisan tradition will be examined chronologically first in the American context and then in the Canadian. This sequence seems to be the logical course to follow since the evidence is overwhelming that local nonpartisanship in Canada is due largely to United States influences--as opposed to the British influences that are reflected in the governmental machinery at the provincial and federal levels.

Nonpartisanship in Canada and the United States will receive separate treatment despite the similarities referred to. The chapter on nonpartisanship in the United States, for example, must explain why political parties dominated civic government during the latter half of the nineteenth century and then declined, whereas the Canadian chapter most profitably considers the reasons why political parties have never dominated local politics in Canada. Moreover, the section on the United States must deal with the factions associated with the persistence of partisanship in some cities but not others. Since Canada has only one major city which is effectively partisan, the research will more effectively examine the factors connected with the different degrees of nonpartisan politics of the various Canadian cities.

FOOTNOTES, CHAPTER I

¹Charles R. Adrian, "Nonpartisanship", International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York: MacMillan and Free Press), p. 201.

²See, for example, John G. Joyce, "Municipal Political Parties in Canada", Master's thesis, University of Western Ontario, 1969, p. 2.

³Adrian, "Nonpartisanship", p. 201.

⁴Robert C. Wood, Suburbia: Its People and Their Politics (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1958), p. 165.

⁵Gerald Pomper, "Ethnic and Group Voting in Nonpartisan Municipal Elections", Public Opinion Quarterly, 30 (Spring, 1966), pp. 79-97; Leon J. Kamin, "Ethnic and Party Affiliations of Candidates as Determinants of Voting", Canadian Journal of Psychology, 10 (December, 1958), pp. 205-212.

⁶Charles R. Adrian, "A Typology of Nonpartisan Elections", Western Political Quarterly, XII (June, 1959), pp. 449-458.

⁷Harold Kaplan, Urban Political Systems: A Functional Analysis of Metro Toronto (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), pp. 181-184.

⁸Adrian, "A Typology"

⁹Ibid., p. 452.

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 453-455.

¹¹Ibid., pp. 455-456.

¹²Ibid.

¹³See, for example, Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 151-153 and Fred I. Greenstein, "The Changing Patterns of Urban Party Politics", Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 353 (May, 1964), p. 10.

¹⁴Kaplan, Urban Political Systems.

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 181-182.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 182-184.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 184.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰John T. Toby, An Introduction to Social Research, second edition (New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, 1967), p. 217.

²¹Ibid., p. 229.

²²Kaplan, Urban Political Systems, p. 182.

²³Ibid.

²⁴See, for example, Ibid., pp. 181-184; Charles R. Adrian, "Some General Characteristics of Non-Partisan Elections", American Political Science Review, XLVI (September, 1952); E.P. Fowler and M.D. Goldrick, "The Toronto Election of 1969: Patterns of Partisan and Nonpartisan Balloting", paper presented to the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Winnipeg, Manitoba, June 4, 1970, p. 2.

²⁵Kaplan, Urban Political Systems, p. 182.

²⁶Fowler and Goldrick remark of the Toronto council, for example, "each member of City Council operated as a separate entity and in a sense merely as one of twenty-three parties, one for each elected position. . . . (V)oters were asked to support individual candidates who were effectively free from accountability." Fowler and Goldrick, "The Toronto Election of 1969 . . .", p. 2.

²⁷V.O. Key, Southern Politics (New York: Knopf, 1950), p. 298. Quoted in Pomper, "Ethnic and Group Voting . . .", p. 94.

²⁸It might be argued that a situation in which two parties formed a coalition in order to control council would fit the "partisan" type. However, the fact that they join in the legislative sphere implies that they were distinct parties in the electoral campaign. Their accountability as parties might be minimal in that they might well break into factions for election purposes, each claiming that the other faction thwarted certain policies that it failed to implement while in office. Obviously, however, in this kind of a situation the system in question could be considered to be on the borderline between the "partisan" and "factional" categories.

²⁹Robert L. Lineberry and Edmund P. Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities", American Political Science Review, LXI (September, 1967), p. 701.

³⁰Pomper, "Ethnic and Group Voting . . .", p. 79.

³¹Robert Salisbury and Gordon Black, "Class and Party in Partisan and Non-Partisan Elections: the Case of Des Moines", American Political Science Review, 57 (September, 1963), p. 587.

³²For a sample listing of the reformist literature see J. Leiper Freeman, "Local Party Systems: Theoretical Considerations and a Case Analysis", American Journal of Sociology, LXIV (November, 1958), p. 282.

³³Banfield and Wilson, City Politics, pp. 154-155.

³⁴Charles E. Gilbert, "Some Aspects of Nonpartisan Elections in Large Cities", Midwest Journal of Political Science, VI (November, 1962), p. 361.

³⁵Eugene C. Lee, The Politics of Nonpartisanship (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960), p. 45.

CHAPTER II

HISTORY OF NONPARTISANSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES

Introduction

During the latter half of the nineteenth century almost all of the major cities in the United States were governed by tightly organized, disciplined political parties. Corresponding to this political reality, the ballot listing the party affiliation of candidates for municipal office was in general use. Both party control of urban government and the partisan ballot form, however, have now become the exception in most United States cities--due largely to the influence of the municipal reform movement which reached its peak during the first two decades of the twentieth century. Widespread anti-party sentiment coupled with specific institutional reforms (chiefly the nonpartisan ballot, the at-large election and the council-manager plan) are credited with eliminating the partisan ballot from about two-thirds of municipal elections and with effectively removing political parties from control of the government of most cities.¹

A historical analysis of the nonpartisan phenomena in the United States appears to be warranted because it is an approach which examines the origins and causes of the nonpartisan sentiment and the corresponding institutional reforms

designed to eliminate parties from the local level. The motives and forces behind the nonpartisan style of urban politics is a crucial aid to understanding the many unintended side-effects that are alleged to have resulted from the removal of party--effects which are far removed from the 'good-government' ideals of the reformers.² A second reason for a historical look at nonpartisanship is the possibility that it might contribute to an understanding of the origins of the "curious paradox" in American political life--namely, that party politics is practised and apparently accepted as legitimate at the state and federal levels but is not considered appropriate at the urban level by a large number of people (and, indeed, is not practised in a large number of cities).³ Thirdly, although effectively nonpartisan politics have been instituted in some cities (and have persisted over time), in other cities, comparable in terms of current social and demographic characteristics, nonpartisanship has never been effected or party control of council has been eliminated for only a short period of time. This situation would appear to be best explained in terms of the differential historical experiences of these cities. For example, the reason that a large city in the East is partisan while a city of similar size and similar in ethnic and class composition on the West Coast is nonpartisan might best be explained in terms of the age of the cities, the period in which they experienced immigration, the past and present political climate of the states

in which they are located, and so on.⁴

Conceptualizing Nonpartisanship

An account of the origin and development of nonpartisanship would appear to require a precise definition of the term. For reasons elaborated in the previous chapter, the meaning of "nonpartisanship" adopted here is a modification of the usage employed by Harold Kaplan⁵ which, in turn, is a modification of the typology developed by Charles Adrian.⁶ Nonpartisanship, as defined in this work, refers to the relatively "unstructured" system of politics characterized by the absence of a "stable, enduring organization" which controls city government and exercises party unity in policy-making. This category is divided into two degrees of nonpartisanship, "factional" and "nonfactional". The "factional" type is characterized by slates or groupings of candidates which coalesce for campaign purposes but, if elected, do not exercise disciplined voting on council; the "nonfactional" political system is the even more fluid style of politics characterized by each candidate running his own campaign on an ad hoc basis, in which no voting discipline is maintained on council. The effectively partisan brand of politics, by way of contrast, involves political activity by major (state or national) or local parties which results in the victorious party exercising disciplined control of the policy-making process. The key factor distinguishing nonpartisan from partisan politics then is that the former lacks the element of overt group cohesiveness

in policy making whereas the partisan system involves overt control of council decision-making by the party with the majority of seats and implicitly provides for the element of responsibility attached to the majority party.⁷ The rationale for basing the definition on Kaplan's typology is elaborated in the previous chapter. It will suffice here to state that his typology was selected over Adrian's primarily because Kaplan explicitly associates nonpartisanship with a relative absence of group cohesion and responsibility in the policy-making process. Partisan politics, on the other hand, involves the control of a majority of council by an overtly partisan group which assumes collective responsibility for council policies. The assumption involved in Kaplan's definitions is that the primary function of a political party is its policy-making function. In placing his emphasis on the legislative role of partisan versus nonpartisan candidates, he implies that policy-making is more important than the recruiting or campaigning function, and that the collective responsibility and accountability associated with the partisan system is absent or diminished in a nonpartisan legislative body. An increasing body of literature associates the effects of the nonpartisan system primarily with the absence of collective responsibility and accountability of the nonpartisan council.⁸ These hypothesized effects will be dealt with in subsequent chapters.

As has been indicated, it is helpful to think of

different degrees of nonpartisanship. Similarly, it is useful to think of nonpartisanship as having more than one dimension. The most obvious conceptualization of the notion is in terms of two dimensions--ideological and institutional. The ideological dimension would include a variety of anti-party sentiments and motives while the institutional dimension would include aspects of the machinery of civic government (such as the nonpartisan ballot or nonpartisan primary). This manner of conceptualizing nonpartisanship would imply, for example, that the nonpartisan ballot is the institutional correlate of the nonpartisan ideology.

Both dimensions include a number of aspects or components. The various aspects of the institutional dimension are relatively plain; they include the nonpartisan ballot, nonpartisan primary, separation of the dates of civic and national or state elections, the small council, at-large elections and so on. However, the components of the ideological dimension of nonpartisanship are not as obvious. Various writers differ as to which values are, indeed, part of the nonpartisan ideology and they differ also in the relative importance they place on different values. The literature on the history of the reform movement and on recent manifestations of nonpartisanship include the following as part of what is called, by various writers, the nonpartisan "ideology",⁹ "philosophy",¹⁰ "ethos",¹¹ or "doctrine":¹² (a) the ideal of local autonomy which is traced all the way back to the colonial towns of New

England and the Atlantic area. Control of urban government by state and national parties is in this view a negation of traditional local autonomy;¹³ (b) belief in direct-democracy which is believed to have existed in traditional American town government. This view assumes that political parties are an unnecessary impediment to direct voter-candidate ties;¹⁴ (c) the Jacksonian principle that the ordinary citizen can and should take part in local government and therefore professional politicians of the type associated with political parties are, at best, unnecessary, at worst, pernicious;¹⁵ (d) the conviction that civic issues involve only questions of administration or "housekeeping". Associated with this is the belief that there is "one best way" to solve administrative problems--i.e., by applying the principles of "efficiency and economy" of the corporate world. Parties introduce irrelevant issues into local government and divert government from concentrating on serving "public interest" of the community as a whole;¹⁶ (e) the ethos of the native white Anglo-Saxon Protestant which places a high value on community consensus and cooperation in civic affairs. Hofstadter and Banfield indicate that this view stresses a 'disinterested' or "public-regarding" participation of the citizen in local affairs;¹⁷ (f) the nativist strain in American thought. Some authors detect the anti-immigrant bias in the reform reaction to the political machine and its immigrant clientele. In this view, the politically powerful immigrant was a

"private-regarding", uneducated and immoral peasant.¹⁸ This list is not intended to be inclusive nor is there a claim that the various values listed above are free from contradiction. It probably is fair to say, however, that at various times in American history, and to various degrees, these ideals taken together represented a general anti-party sentiment which can be conceptualized as the ideological dimension of nonpartisanship.

In the remaining portion of this chapter, nonpartisanship, in both its ideological and institutional dimensions will be traced chronologically through a critical review of the literature on the subject.

The Early Pattern

Robert Wood, in his influential book on the politics of American suburbia, traces the history of the pervasive "no-party politics" of suburbia back to the institutions and values of small towns of Colonial America.¹⁹ He stresses the relative autonomy of the colonial town and its practice of direct-democracy as an important and influential legacy in American thought on local government. Wood points out that the early towns along the Atlantic seaboard exercised a considerable degree of autonomy and democracy. They controlled essential powers such as police and taxation and carried out local government through a popular political process. "When the abstractions about localism began to appear, then, there

was historical precedent and a tradition of actual practise on which to rest the case."²⁰ These abstractions were provided, before the Revolution by Jefferson and after the Revolution by de Tocqueville. Jefferson wrote,

(t)hose wards, called townships in New England . . . have proved themselves the wisest inventions ever devised by the wit of man. . . . Each ward would be a small republic within itself and every man in the State would thus become an active member of the common government. . . .²¹

Wood sees nonpartisanship of today as a legacy of the Jeffersonian era which goes "beyond a simple antagonism to partisanship" to an ideal which "antidates the party system": "As a theory, nonpartisanship harks back to the traditional concept of local government, to Jefferson's high expectations of the rational capacity of the yeoman. . . ."²²

Wood continues his persuasive argument to the effect that this ideology has remained unchallenged even in the modern American society. Twentieth century technology has permitted a renaissance of the small town--as evidence by the preference for residence in relatively small political units--the suburbs--which are largely nonpartisan.

Wood's argument is credible insofar as it appears that the Jacksonian city maintained a radical form of representation akin to the direct-democracy ideal. Widespread suffrage, the direct election of legislative, administrative and judicial officials, and the short term appear to reflect this

traditional ideal. Similarly, the "home rule" movement of the progressive era is in keeping with the ideal of autonomy of the colonial town. However, Wood's thesis appears tenuous when we consider that other planks in the reform platform appear inconsistent with this ancient legacy. For example, the city-manager plan, a principle tenet in the reform movement and the prevailing form in the American suburb,²³ represents an attempt to graft the business corporation to the local government structure. A primary objective of the manager-plan is to remove most issues from the concern of the politicians (and indirectly the citizen) and place them in the hands of a professional manager. The manager-plan rationale implies that civic issues are too complex for the ordinary citizen and that their management requires expert training. This departure from the ideology and institutions of Jeffersonian times weakens Wood's argument. The phenomenon of placing many of the tasks of civic government in the hands of a multiplicity of boards, commissions, authorities and the like, effectively removing vital functions such as education, police and transportation from the elective arena would appear to contradict Wood's argument that the modern municipality represents "the resurrection of (the) historic principles"²⁴ of autonomy and direct-democracy. This is not to imply that the values of autonomy and direct democracy have not been present or influential in the historical development of nonpartisan sentiment and nonpartisan institutions, but these examples

illustrate, perhaps, that they were not as exclusive nor as effective as Wood makes out.

The Jacksonian City

The Jacksonian era brought a change not so much in the ideals but in the machinery of local government. The town meeting system was replaced by representative local government. "Boston, in 1822, was the last to abandon the town meeting. . . ." ²⁵ Universal manhood suffrage and the system of checks and balances (the latter inspired by the examples of state and national constitutions ²⁶ and by the desire for popular control) ²⁷ contributed largely to the transformation of the machinery and the style of urban government. By the middle of the nineteenth century, devices to insure popular control proliferated. In keeping with the frontier notion that public officials should be chosen directly by the people, numerous offices, such as that of tax collector, clerk, city attorney and the officers of various boards and commissions became elective. This emphasis on the election of officials gave rise to the long or "bedsheet" ballot. ²⁸ The elected mayor and the short term were similarly instituted during this period.

This pattern of urban government, characterized by the principle of checks and balances and election of myriads of civic officials, constituted the prevailing form during the last half of the nineteenth century. ²⁹ Yet these unwieldy

structures were faced with immense demographic and social pressures which created increasing demands for governmental action. Effective action was not forthcoming from the hamstrung civic governments--characterized by large councils and other elected officials each with an independent mandate providing no effective incentive to cooperate in policy-making or administration.

The Urban Party Machine

By the mid-nineteenth century the governments of most major cities were effectively controlled by well-organized, disciplined political party organizations known as the political "machine". The rise of the machine and its demise have received much attention in the American political literature.³⁰ Its existence is generally attributed to the massive influx of immigrants into the urban centres in America in the latter half of the nineteenth century and to the organizational requirements of the growing city, as well as to a number of other factors.

The most obvious challenge to the traditional political ideals and practices of the American city came from the presence of large numbers of foreigners that were flooding the major cities. During the thirty-year period from 1860 to 1890 the urban population increased from sixteen to twenty-nine percent of the national total.³¹ By 1900, New York counted 37 percent of its population as foreign born; Chicago's figure

for the same year was about 35 percent.³² "Between the Civil War and the First World War, the United States managed somehow to absorb 25 million foreigners."³³

Greenstein has characterized the lot of the bulk of the urban population, especially the immigrants, of this period as "nasty and brutish".³⁴ The absence of social welfare measures, low wages, and the additional insecurity posed by their presence in the midst of an alien culture and language gave rise to needs with which the decentralized urban government was not prepared to cope. The free male franchise and the practise of electing legislative administrative and judicial officials gave the immigrant, to whom the vote had little abstract value,³⁵ a resource which he could trade for the basic necessities he so desperately needed. The political machine was able to provide him with jobs, informal welfare services, protection from legal prosecution, deference to ethnic pride and other services in return for his vote. Another possible reason for the rise of the political machine as an indigenous American institution suggested by Fred Greenstein is the absence of strong traditional authorities such as an established church or a strong aristocracy.³⁶

In addition to the reasons mentioned above the machine was supported also by the business element. Businessmen, engaging in legal or illegal activities, found it necessary to deal with civic authorities and were prepared to pay for

the opportunity to reap large profits. The political machine was, for the right price, willing and able to commit the entire urban government on matters such as the granting of large franchises and contracts or the indifference of its captive police force to illegal activities.

The early literature on the machine is heavily pejorative. The muckrakers and reformers of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries perceived only the negative function of the machine. Their moral outrage is evidenced by the statements of some of the leading figures of the day. In 1888, James Bryce characterized American city government as "the one conspicuous failure of the United States."³⁷ Lincoln Steffans saw boss rule as "the government of the people, by the rascals, for the rich."³⁸ Andrew White, the first president of Cornell University, betraying a nativist bias, declared that the city in the United States was "the worst in Christendom" and should not be governed by "a crowd of illiterate peasants, freshly raked in from the Irish bogs, or Bohemian mines, or Italian robber nests. . . ."³⁹

More recent political literature is more considerate of the activities of the political machine.⁴⁰ Current writers recognize what the early reformers overlooked--namely that the machine arose in part because of the deficiencies in public policy of that period. The machine bridged the gap between the numerous centres of authority and met many of the

real needs of the urban population, albeit in a rough and ready manner and not without extracting a heavy commission for its services.⁴¹

The Municipal Reform Movement

The latter part of the nineteenth century saw the rise of organized opposition to the corruption of civic government associated with the urban party machine. In the 1870's, the forerunners of the municipal reform movement became active. These groups were commonly labelled "voters leagues", "citizens leagues", or "nonpartisan reform committees", and were led chiefly by academicians and small businessmen. Many of these reform groups joined together to form the National Municipal League in 1884 which subsequently became the leading organization of the reform movement.⁴²

The ideological motivations of the municipal reformers were, in Hofstadter's view, closely linked with the values of the Progressive movement. He points out that the Progressive movement began in the cities and was really underway in the 1880's--although historians usually consider its heyday to have been the period between 1900 and the beginning of the First World War.⁴³

In a famous passage in his Age of Reform, Hofstadter indicates that the municipal reform movement is best understood in the light of an underlying basic difference in the native American and immigrant values:

Out of the clash between the needs of the immigrants and the sentiments of the natives there emerged two thoroughly different systems of political ethics. . . . One, founded upon the indigenous Yankee-Protestant political tradition and upon middle class life, assumed and demanded the constant, disinterested activity of the citizen in public affairs, argued that political life ought to be run . . . in accordance with general principles and abstract laws apart from and superior to personal needs. . . . The other system, founded upon the European backgrounds of the immigrants, upon their unfamiliarity with independent political action, their familiarity with hierarchy and authority and upon the urgent needs that so often grew out of their migration, took for granted that the political life of the individual would arise out of family needs, interpreted political and civic relations chiefly in terms of personal obligations, and placed strong personal loyalties above allegiance to abstract codes of law or morals. It was chiefly upon this system of values that the political life of the immigrant, the boss, and the urban machine was based.⁴⁴

Writers on urban politics have used Hofstadter's notion of the two contrasting political ethics to explain various aspects of local affairs, including nonpartisanship. Banfield and Wilson in their book, City Politics, and in a later journal article⁴⁵ develop a theory of "public" and "private-regardingness", taking their cue from this passage in Hofstadter's work. In their view there are two fundamental conceptions of the public interest held by two groups in the city, divided along ethnic and income lines:

(The public-regarding ethos) which derives from the middle-class ethos, favors what the municipal reform movement has always defined as "good government"--namely efficiency, impartiality, honesty, planning, strong executives, model legal codes. . . . (The other (private-regarding) conception of the public interest (one never explicitly formulated as such, but one all the same) derives from the "immigrant ethos". This is the conception of those people who identify with the ward or

neighborhood rather than the city "as a whole" . . . and who are far less interested in the efficiency, impartiality, and honesty of local government than in its readiness to confer material benefits . . . upon them.⁴⁶

Difficulties appear in the ethos theory, as Wolfinger and Field have pointed out,⁴⁷ when these passages of Hofstadter and Banfield and Wilson are examined in the light of historical evidence. For example, are the public-regarding native Americans not the same group that is alleged to espouse the "invisible hand" doctrine in economic affairs--i.e., that the result of individuals pursuing their respective self-interests would lead automatically to the public good? Did the reformers of the Progressive era oppose the immigrant-based political machine because of their superior moral code (as Banfield implies), or because their formerly unchallenged role as civic leaders had been diminished by the machine? Did the immigrants bring with them the spoils system or was their political role thrust upon them by the hostility and exploitation they experienced from the native American? The important point here, however, is not to determine whether one "ethos" was more "right" or "wrong" than the other but to determine, supposing a different political orientation based on ethnic and class lines, the connection between nonpartisan institutional arrangements on the one hand and these different orientations. Banfield and Wilson have stated that an important link does exist. Specifically that the middle class ethos is conducive to government by experts in the interests

of the whole city, commission plan, city manager plan, non-partisan ballots, at-large elections, separation of the dates of city and state or national elections, and so on. The private-regarding orientation of the immigrant or lower class voter favors the retention of the mayor-council plan, partisan elections, ward elections, in general a retention of the explicitly political institutional arrangements as opposed to the more administrative forms.⁴⁸ A closer look at the makeup of the major reform groups and the chief institutional changes they advocated will allow a more detailed examination of the alleged link between the "reform package"⁴⁹ and the values associated with it.

Influence of Specific Reform Measures

Shortly after the turn of the century, the reformers, who were learning through painful experience that it was difficult to dislodge the machine without changing the conditions which gave rise to it, began to concentrate their efforts upon changing the structure of city government.

The commission plan, which first appears in Galveston in 1901, was designed to correct the decentralized structure of the city. The plan called for the direct election of about five commissioners who together would form the city council. They would be elected at-large on a nonpartisan ballot and each commissioner would administer one aspect of civic government while overall policy would be made by the council as a

whole. The new plan, however, rapidly fell into disfavor and was abandoned in many cities because it suffered from the very difficulties it was designed to correct. Like its Jacksonian predecessor, the commission city suffered from decentralized authority.⁵⁰ Since each commissioner was elected for a particular office and felt responsible primarily for the efficient functioning of his own department, he had little incentive to cooperate with his fellow commissioners. The plan began to lose ground after 1917.⁵¹ In 1960, only 12 percent of all cities in the United States retained this form.⁵² Thirty-nine percent of the commission cities now employ the nonpartisan ballot which is high compared to the newer council-manager plan, only sixteen percent of which make use of the party label.⁵³

More influential structural manifestations reflecting middle-class preferences followed the fading of the commission plan. The National Municipal League, a thoroughly middle-class organization, developed and effectively propagated a crystallization of the reform ideas that have been referred to as the "reform package". Nonpartisan and at-large elections were cardinal features of the League's "municipal program" in 1900. The manager-plan was added to these tenets in the "Model City Charter" published in 1916 and issued periodically from then on. The close relationship between the nonpartisan ballot, at-large elections, and the city-manager plan, is stressed by Banfield and Wilson⁵⁴ and by Greenstein⁵⁵ and is supported by

a close statistical relationship among these features. Wolfinger and Field, for example, in a 1963 study of the 309 American cities over 50,000 in population, found that the 146 manager cities were consistent

. . . in their adoption of the other two structural variables; 85 per cent of them use the nonpartisan ballot, 81 per cent elect their councilmen at-large, and 70 per cent use both the nonpartisan ballot and at-large elections.⁵⁶

The International City Managers' Association considers nonpartisanship and at-large elections key elements of the manager-plan.⁵⁷

The city-manager plan (also known as the council-manager plan) makes a sharp distinction between policy and administration. The evils of the spoils era, in the view of the manager-plan advocates, are due largely to the interference by party politicians in "rational" administration. Policy is made by a small council of laymen (usually after receiving the policy recommendations from the manager) who are elected at-large on a nonpartisan ballot. The city manager, an appointed professional administrator, then takes charge of the detailed administration of this policy with the help of a merit civil service under his complete control. The explicit aim of the plan was to eliminate "politics" from city government--and "politics" usually meant "partisanship" to the early supporters of the plan.⁵⁸

The manager plan has received sustained promotion and widespread acceptance since it first appeared in 1910. It has been a feature of the National Municipal League's Model City Charter since 1916 and has received vigorous promotion in the influential League journal, The National Municipal Review, first published in 1912. A book on the new plan was published in the League Series in 1915. The League's efforts at promoting the plan were shared by the International City Manager's Association until 1929, when the Association ceased its efforts but the League carried on.⁶⁰ By 1915, there were 49 manager cities, and by 1920, the plan was employed by 158 cities. This growth has continued undiminished. Adrian and Press report finding 2,150 manager cities in the United States and Canada in 1967, 50 percent of which were between 10,000 and 500,000 in population. The most rapid growth has occurred since the end of World War II and has paralleled the rapid expansion of suburbia.⁶⁰

An important point to keep in mind in relation to the statistical correlations between the nonpartisan ballot and other features of American cities is the fact that the ballot form does not directly measure the political reality. In cities where the ballot is legally nonpartisan but where other conditions are consistent with party activity, party control of council may persist; in other formally nonpartisan cities the party may be only one of the groups competing for election with no group prevailing on council (factional type); in still

other cities no party or slate competition takes place but individual candidates organizing their own campaigns on an ad-hoc basis compete for election to council (nonfactional type). There is no data on the majority of cities which would indicate if they are, indeed, effectively nonpartisan. The problem faced by all writers whose studies include more than a few cities is that all data-gathering agencies "lump together indiscriminately all cities which do not put party affiliations on their ballots."⁶¹ The literature on nonpartisanship, however, continues to use data on the legal form of the ballot as the best available measure of effectively nonpartisan cities. Alford and Lee, for example, in a study of cities about 25,000 population, state, ". . . (W)e are forced to use a legal definition of partisan and nonpartisan elections."⁶² The assumption that legal nonpartisanship is highly correlated with effective nonpartisanship is admittedly weak, but it is made by writers such as Charles Adrian and Eugene Lee who are considered authorities on nonpartisanship.⁶³ This assumption will be made in this paper as well, with the cautionary note that the statistical relationships drawn between nonpartisanship and other variables (relationships which abound in the journalistic literature) are not as significant as they appear. Also, wherever possible the evidence on effectively nonpartisan cities which does exist will be cited.

The increase in nonpartisan cities in the early decades of the twentieth century reflected a corresponding decline

in the prevalence of the urban machine. The decline of the old style of political organization appears to have been caused only partly by explicit anti-party legislation such as the nonpartisan ballot. Other influences that led to a decline of the machine are generally thought to include a) legislation putting the civil service in many cities on a merit basis, b) the rise of alternative group organizations such as trade unions, c) a decline in immigration, d) social welfare measures (especially since the New Deal) and other factors.⁶⁴ The combined effect of explicit anti-party legislation and other party-weakening forces such as those listed above are credited with effectively eliminating the political party from most United States cities. Adrian comments: "By and large, the reformers' goal of eliminating national party activity from local elections appears to have succeeded remarkably well."⁶⁵ Similarly, Lineberry and Fowler, in a 1960 survey of 200 cities over 50,000 in population, found that policymaking was substantially insulated from partisan influence.⁶⁶ The extent of effectively nonpartisan cities is suggested by the spread of the nonpartisan ballot form. By 1914, this type of ballot was being incorporated in most new city charters and state legislatures adopted similar legislation for noncharter cities.⁶⁷ In 1929, approximately 57 percent of cities over 30,000 were nonpartisan and by 1959 about two-thirds of the cities had become legally nonpartisan.⁶⁸

Persistence of Nonpartisanship

Up to this point the emphasis has been on the general factors associated with the origin and development of nonpartisanship in the nation as a whole. A complete analysis still must answer two basic questions: a) What variables are associated with nonpartisanship in specific categories of cities, differentiated by criteria such as age of the city, region, ethnic or class composition or governmental structure? b) What factors in the political life of some cities but not in others accounts for the persistence of partisanship? Some of the more obvious factors will be examined first and then the more involved relationships will be discussed.

Perhaps the most obvious factor associated with the persistence of nonpartisanship in the United States is the age of the various cities. Charles Adrian has indicated that "a city with a high degree of political organization" may resist the influence of nonpartisanship, especially those governed in the past by a machine.⁶⁹ Cities of this type were, of course, found in the Northeastern United States where nonpartisanship is now least in evidence. The cities in the Southwest and West were quite small during the period of maximum machine politics. By the time the cities in the latter regions were of sufficient size and complexity to qualify as prime targets for machine control, the tide of reform had effected both the prevailing attitude to local party politics and the availability of patronage that would serve to support the old

political style. Wolfinger and Field support this interpretation:

Most eastern and midwestern cities were important communities in the nineteenth century, before the National Municipal League's various structural reforms were seriously proposed. Their political institutions were well established and had seen hard service in the first generation of industrialization. Politicians generally had vested interests in maintaining the existing forms and most political actors had at least developed means of dealing with these forms. These attachments and accommodations were weaker and less developed in newer cities or cities undergoing tremendous growth. They were even more irrelevant when it came to deciding on governmental institutions for brand new communities. In such cases, there was no presumption in favor of the status quo, and writers of municipal constitutions were responsive to contemporary political fashions. . . . (R)egional differences in the age of cities may explain a good deal of the striking variations in form of government, type of ballot, and method of electing councilmen.⁷⁰

In their 1963 nationwide study of communities with more than 50,000 residents, Wolfinger and Field found, for example, that only 39 percent of the cities in the Northeast used the nonpartisan ballot while the corresponding figures for the Midwest were 67 percent, for the South, 81 percent, and cities in the West were 95 percent nonpartisan.⁷¹

The differential influences of the Progressive movement in various regions appears to be reflected in the municipal law of the states in these regions. Both of these factors (state municipal law and strength of Progressive sentiment in the past) appear to be related to the distribution of nonpartisan cities and to the persistence of this form. California's

legal provisions favoring nonpartisanship, for example, have been attributed by some writers to the strength of the Progressive movement in that state--specifically, to the Progressive victory in the election of 1910.⁷² Two statutory provisions that are thought to be especially effective in the persistence of nonpartisanship in California are: a) the provision for cross filing in primaries and b) the formal separation of local and state organizations.⁷³ Banfield and Wilson state that in "those regions in which Progressivism and populism were strongest during the early years of this century are the ones with the highest proportion of nonpartisan cities." They cite as evidence the fact that in 1960 in cities over 25,000 population, 98 percent of the Plains cities were nonpartisan whereas only 23 percent of the middle Atlantic cities of comparable size had adopted the nonpartisan form of ballot.⁷⁴ Greenstein points out that in the Eastern industrial cities there are minimal legal impediments to party activity and that those measures that were adopted came later than in cities in other regions. "Connecticut, for example, was the last state in the union to adopt direct primary legislation. . . ."⁷⁵ The importance of the legal provisions of each state are suggested by Charles Gilbert's study of twenty of the largest cities outside the South. He found that "large cities in the same state are almost always all partisan or nonpartisan."⁷⁶

The rationale of looking at political characteristics of the state political system to reveal reasons for urban

nonpartisanship was carried further in a study by Phillips Cutright (published in 1963).⁷⁷ He related the ballot form in 480 cities over 25,000 in population to: a) the degree of major party competitiveness in the state and b) the degree of loyalty to major parties exhibited by voters in each state.

The measure for competitiveness was based on the average of the vote for United States representatives in each state in congressional elections from 1944 to 1950. A competitive state was so defined if the Democratic vote in that state was between 46 percent and 56 percent of the total. His hypothesis was that the degree of competition in a state would be positively correlated with the retention of a partisan ballot. He found that ". . . (C)ities in the competitive states are more than twice as likely to have retained partisan ballots than cities in the noncompetitive states."⁷⁸ In noncompetitive (or one-party) states he found that the nonpartisan ballot was usually adopted after the condition of one-party rule at the state level had been established. He offers no explanation for this finding. Reasons that suggest themselves include: a) the tendency for the dominant state party to view the civic level as its legitimate domain (i.e., an administrative extension of the state system) and hence the introduction of anti-party legislation would be designed to keep the minority party from establishing an urban foothold; b) the desire of the state machine to keep the Negro from political power (most one-party states are in the "solid South") which would

be easier in the reformed city with the depoliticizing effect alleged to result from reform institutions. In the absence of relevant evidence, these points must remain highly speculative, however.

The other state characteristic examined by Cutright was degree of voter loyalty to one of the major parties. The 'loyalty' measure was based on the percentage vote for third party candidates in the 1912 and 1924 Presidential elections. A third party vote over 30 percent meant that that state was "low" on the loyalty scale; below 30 percent was considered to signify a "high" level of partisan attachment. Cutright found that a significant relationship existed--38 percent of the cities in high-loyalty states had partisan elections compared to 28 percent in low loyalty states. The data supported his hypothesis that states with loyal party supporters would tend to oppose the introduction of the nonpartisan ballot at the civic level. Again, Cutright offers no further explanation for this relationship. Gilbert's view that the overwhelming nonpartisan character of West Coast cities is due in part to the traditional weak party loyalty (as evidenced by the common practice of split ticket voting) is, nevertheless, similar to Cutright's findings.⁷⁹

The discussion above has dealt with characteristics associated with the relatively gross variables of state or region. It is conceivable that the regional and state

differences in the distribution and persistence of nonpartisanship reflect an underlying variable that might be broadly classified as "political ethos". It is upon the various components of the "ethos theory" as determinants of nonpartisanship that most writers have focused their attention. The ethos theory implies that community cleavages arise out of the interaction of two basic groups holding fundamentally different political orientations based on differences in class, ethnic origin and religion. This view implies that strong ethnic, class or religious cleavages provide "political parties with the social basis necessary for effective organization and sufficient activity necessary for survival as a community force."⁸⁰ Hence, party organization would be difficult to maintain in homogeneous communities, and conversely, partisanship would be easier to maintain in heterogeneous communities. There is ample evidence that in the aggregate, cities tend to follow this pattern, with some significant exceptions that can be explained in terms of the differential historical backgrounds of cities that do not fit the pattern.

Data presented by Wolfinger and Field in a 1966 article support the view that the "immigrant ethos" associated with the existence of a significant group in a city which is a) working class, b) "ethnic" or c) Catholic favors the retention of unreformed institutions such as nonpartisan elections, wards, and the mayor-council form. On the other hand, they found that if a significant portion of the urban population

was a) native born, b) Protestant or c) middle class, the community was more likely to have adopted and retained the reformed city structure.⁸¹

Phillips Cutright's study of 480 cities in 48 states supports the ethos theory on two of the variables, class and religion.⁸² He used as a measure of class composition the number of persons employed in manufacturing. If over 50 percent of the city's labor force was employed in manufacturing in 1950, the city was considered to be "high" on the manufacturing measure and hence predominantly lower class. Cities with less than 50 percent of the labor force in manufacturing were considered predominantly middle class. His results substantiated the ethos theory--". . . (S)ome 44 percent of the high manufacturing cities retained partisan elections compared to 27 percent of the low manufacturing cities."⁸³ This relationship between class and partisan/nonpartisan form of government is supported by the case study literature which indicates that movements to return to a partisan system come from working-class groups.⁸⁴

Cutright's measure for religious cleavage was premised on the assumption that in communities with more than 20 percent Catholic inhabitants, the possibility for politically effective cleavage was present. If the city was less than 20 percent Catholic in religious composition, it was assumed to be "low" on religious cleavage since the minority would be too

small to be politically effective. He further assumed that communities with a high level of religious cleavage would be more likely to provide a base for partisan politics. His assumption was confirmed--"44 percent of the high Catholic cities have retained partisan elections compared to 27 percent of the low-Catholic cities."⁸⁵

Support for the view that ethnicity is related to partisanship/nonpartisanship is given by Gilbert's study of large cities. His survey of the census figures from 1900 to 1940 revealed that there was a lower proportion of European foreign born in nonpartisan cities west of the Mississippi than in most partisan cities in the East.⁸⁶ Wolfinger and Field, similarly, found that in the 309 cities over 50,000 in population in 1960,

. . . those regions with the largest foreign stock populations have the highest proportion of cities with elements of the private-regarding ethic. There are some exceptions to this, notably in the popularity of nonpartisanship in New England and in the consistent deviation of the West, but by and large the pattern is as predicted by the ethos theory.⁸⁷

These deviations in the relationship between ethnicity and nonpartisanship must now be examined. As indicated above, New England cities are heavily populated by foreign stock and yet are predominantly nonpartisan. The literature offers no specific explanation for this, but it is possible to speculate that the anti-party values of traditional New England--specifically, autonomy and direct-democracy--are stronger there

than elsewhere and have resisted partisan politics.

The second deviation from the generally strong relationship with ethnicity and nonpartisanship exists in the West. The factor of proportion of ethnic stock does not appear to be the answer. Large cities on the West Coast, for example, have approximately the same foreign stock population as the large Eastern cities. Nonpartisan San Francisco had 43.5 percent foreign stock in 1960 compared to 42 percent for partisan New Haven; Los Angeles had 32.6 percent foreign stock while Chicago listed 35.9 percent; Seattle's population was 31.4 percent foreign stock.⁸⁸ The simple explanation that first and second generation Americans have the same effect on the pattern of urban politics is obviously inadequate. The most obvious explanation appears to be that the West Coast was populated later than the Eastern cities. The reform influence was not countered by the inertia effect of established partisan patterns. A related reason appears to be that the West Coast has fewer first or second generation European immigrants--Gilbert's review of census data from 1900 to 1940 indicates this.⁸⁹ The Mexican-American and Orientals, who make up a sizeable portion of West Coast cities, are considered to be less likely to become politically involved than their counterparts from Europe,⁹⁰ hence less likely to support a political party. Wolfinger suggests that the experience of even the European ethnics were different in the West than the East:

. . . (I)n the Northeast the non-British immigrants came to settled communities with relatively stable class structures and systems of status ascription. Only menial jobs were open to them. . . . On the other hand immigrants came to the West at the same time as the Yankees, or on their heels. The two groups . . . lived in communities with widely fluctuating economies and unsettled social systems. Economic advantage was not so closely associated with ethnicity, and class distinctions were not so rigid.⁹¹

Wolfinger suggests that since economic and social advancement was denied the immigrants in the East (relative to the West), they sought a political avenue for their ambitions and that this explains in part the different degrees of political partisanship in the cities of the two regions.

Summary

In this chapter, an attempt has been made to examine the origins and causes of the nonpartisan style of politics now practised in most American cities. Nonpartisanship was defined in terms of the absence of disciplined party control of civic policy-making. The concept was classified in terms of two dimensions--ideological and institutional. The various manifestations of nonpartisanship was studied historically through a critically review of the literature. Evidence in the literature was cited which appeared to support the general conclusion that effectively nonpartisan local politics is closely related to the existence of various aspects of the ideology of nonpartisanship.

FOOTNOTES, CHAPTER II

¹Sixty-five percent of municipal elections in the United States are legally nonpartisan--i.e., political party affiliation is not printed on the ballot. See Charles R. Adrian, "Nonpartisanship", International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York: MacMillan and Free Press), p. 201. Elsewhere Adrian maintains that in the majority of cases legally nonpartisan cities are effectively nonpartisan--i.e., Council is not controlled by a disciplined party. See Charles R. Adrian, "A Typology of Nonpartisan Elections", Western Political Quarterly, XII (June, 1959), pp. 456-458.

²Adrian, "Nonpartisanship", p. 201; see also Fred I. Greenstein, "The Changing Pattern of Urban Party Politics", Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 353 (May, 1964), pp. 10-11; Eugene C. Lee, The Politics of Nonpartisanship (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960), Chapters 11 and 12.

³Charles R. Adrian, "Some General Characteristics of Nonpartisan Elections", American Political Science Review, XLVI (September, 1952), pp. 766-776.

⁴Raymond Wolfinger and John Field, "Political Ethos and the Structure of Local Government", American Political Science Review, LX (September, 1966), pp. 306-326.

⁵Harold Kaplan, Urban Political Systems: A Functional Analysis of Metro Toronto (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), pp. 181-184.

⁶Adrian, "A Typology. . . ."

⁷Kaplan, Urban Political Systems, p. 182.

⁸See for example Ibid., pp. 181-184; E.P. Fowler and M.D. Goldrick, "The Toronto Election of 1969: Patterns of Partisan and Nonpartisan Balloting", paper presented to the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Winnipeg, Manitoba, June 4, 1970, p. 2; Charles R. Adrian, "Some General Characteristics . . .", pp. 766-776.

⁹Robert C. Wood, Suburbia: Its People and Their Politics (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1958), p. 2; Adrian, "Nonpartisanship", p. 201.

¹⁰Lee, The Politics of Nonpartisanship, p. 2.

¹¹Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics. Quoted in Wolfinger and Field, "Political Ethos . . .", p. 306.

¹²Greenstein, "The Changing Pattern . . .", p. 10.

¹³Wood, Suburbia, Chapter 2.

¹⁴Ibid.; Lee, The Politics of Nonpartisanship, p. 3.

¹⁵Wood, Suburbia, Chapter 2.

¹⁶Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 153.

¹⁷Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955), pp. 8-9; Banfield and Wilson, City Politics, p. 46.

¹⁸Andrew D. White, The Forum (December, 1890). Quoted in Banfield and Wilson, City Politics, p. 153; Hofstadter, The Age of Reform, p. 177.

¹⁹Wood, Suburbia, Chapter 2.

²⁰Ibid., p. 25. Kenneth Crawford also emphasizes the independence of the Colonial small town of New England. See Kenneth G. Crawford, Canadian Municipal Government (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1954), p. 22.

²¹P.S. Jones, ed., The Basic Writings of Thomas Jefferson (New York, 1944), p. 749. Quoted in Wood, Suburbia.

²²Wood, Suburbia, p. 22.

²³In a 1960 study of 300 suburbs lying within the 25 largest urbanized areas in the United States (with a population exceeding 10,000), Schnore and Alford found that 62.7 percent were nonpartisan compared to only 37.3 percent that

continued use of the partisan ballot. See Leo F. Schnore and Robert R. Alford, "Forms of Government and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Suburbs", Administrative Science Quarterly, VII (June, 1963), p. 11.

²⁴Wood, Suburbia, p. 51.

²⁵Ibid., p. 28.

²⁶Charles R. Adrian and Charles Press, Governing Urban America, third edition (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968), p. 73.

²⁷J.A. Corry, Democratic Government and Politics, second edition (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1951), p. 606.

²⁸Adrian and Press, Governing Urban America, p. 74.

²⁹Ibid., p. 75.

³⁰See for example, Ibid.; Greenstein, "The Changing Pattern . . ."; Banfield and Wilson, City Politics; William L. Riordon, Plunkitt of Tammany Hall (New York: E.D. Dutton and Company, Inc., 1963); and Harold F. Gosnell, Machine Politics (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1968).

³¹Frank M. Stewart, A Half Century of Municipal Reform: The History of the National Municipal League (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1950), p. 2.

³²Frank J. Goodnow, Municipal Government (New York: Century, 1909), p. 27.

³³Greenstein, "The Changing Pattern . . .", p. 5.

³⁴Ibid., p. 5.

³⁵Raymond E. Wolfinger, "The Development and Persistence of Ethnic Voting", American Political Science Review, LIX (December, 1959), p. 898.

³⁶Greenstein, "The Changing Pattern . . .", p. 3.

³⁷James Bryce, The American Commonwealth, I, p. 608. Quoted in Stewart, Half Century, p. 7.

³⁸Lincoln Steffans, Autobiography, p. 494. Quoted in Woods, Suburbia, p. 36.

³⁹White, "The Government of American Cities", pp. 357-372.

⁴⁰See, for example, Greenstein, "The Changing Patterns. . ."

⁴¹Banfield and Wilson, City Politics, p. 115-116.

⁴²Adrian and Press, Governing Urban America, p. 80.

⁴³Richard Hofstadter, ed., The Progressive Movement 1900-1915 (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 1 and 9.

⁴⁴Hofstadter, Age of Reform, pp. 8-9.

⁴⁵James Q. Wilson and Edward C. Banfield, "Public Regard-
ingness as a Value Premise in Voting Behavior", American Poli-
tical Science Review, LVIII (December, 1964), pp. 876-887.

⁴⁶Banfield and Wilson, City Politics, p. 46.

⁴⁷Wolfinger and Field, "Political Ethos . . .", pp. 306-310.

⁴⁸Banfield and Wilson, City Politics.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 151.

⁵⁰Greenstein, "The Changing Patterns . . .", p. 4; and Schnore and Alford, "Forms of Government . . .", p. 5.

⁵¹Adrian and Press, Governing Urban America, p. 81.

⁵²B. Dinerman, W.C. Crouch and J.C. Bollens, "Organiza-
tion and Structure of Local Government in the United States",
in Local Government in the United States of America (The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961), p. 28.

⁵³International City Managers Association, The Municipal
Yearbook (1967), p. 108.

- ⁵⁴Banfield and Wilson, City Politics, p. 151.
- ⁵⁵Greenstein, "The Changing Pattern . . .", p. 11.
- ⁵⁶Wolfinger and Field, "Political Ethos . . .", p. 312.
- ⁵⁷Ibid.
- ⁵⁸D.S. Wright, "The City Manager as a Developmental Administrator", in Robert T. Doland, ed., Comparative Urban Research (Beverly Hills: Sage Publication, 1969), p. 207.
- ⁵⁹Stewart, Half Century, p. 75.
- ⁶⁰Adrian and Press, Governing Urban America, p. 81.
- ⁶¹Banfield and Wilson, City Politics, p. 3.
- ⁶²Alford, Robert R. and Eugene C. Lee, "Voting Turnout in American Cities", American Political Science Review, LXII (September, 1968), p. 799.
- ⁶³See for example, Adrian, "A Typology . . ."; Alford and Lee, "Voting Turnout . . .", p. 799.
- ⁶⁴Greenstein, "The Changing Pattern . . .", pp. 7-10.
- ⁶⁵Adrian, "A Typology . . .", p. 458.
- ⁶⁶Robert L. Lineberry and Edmund P. Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities", American Political Science Review, LXI (September, 1967), pp. 701-716.
- ⁶⁷Lee, The Politics of Nonpartisanship, p. 23.
- ⁶⁸Ibid., p. 24.
- ⁶⁹Adrian, "Some General Characteristics . . .", p. 768.
- ⁷⁰Wolfinger and Field, "Political Ethos . . .", p. 326.
- ⁷¹Ibid., p. 316.
- ⁷²Ibid., p. 326.

⁷³Charles E. Gilbert, "Some Aspects of Nonpartisan Elections in Large Cities", Midwest Journal of Political Science, VI (November, 1962), p. 356.

⁷⁴Banfield and Wilson, City Politics, pp. 154-155.

⁷⁵Greenstein, "The Changing Pattern . . .", p. 10.

⁷⁶Gilbert, "Some Aspects . . .", p. 360.

⁷⁷Phillips Cutright, "Nonpartisan Electoral Systems in American Cities", Comparative Studies in Society and History, V (January, 1963), pp. 212-226.

⁷⁸Ibid., p. 215.

⁷⁹Gilbert, "Some Aspects . . .", p. 354.

⁸⁰Cutright, "Nonpartisan Electoral Systems . . .", p. 218.

⁸¹Wolfinger and Field, "Political Ethos . . .", p. 317.

⁸²Cutright, "Nonpartisan Electoral Systems . . .", pp. 219-226.

⁸³Ibid., p. 220.

⁸⁴Edwin O. Stone and George K. Floro, Abandonments of the Manager Plan (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Publications, 1953). Cited in Cutright, "Nonpartisan Electoral Systems . . .", p. 219.

⁸⁵Cutright, "Nonpartisan Electoral Systems . . .", p. 221.

⁸⁶Gilbert, "Some Aspects . . .", p. 357.

⁸⁷Wolfinger and Field, "Political Ethos . . .", p. 317.

⁸⁸Wolfinger, "Development and Persistence . . .", p. 898.

⁸⁹Gilbert, "Some Aspects . . .", p. 357.

⁹⁰Wolfinger and Field, "Political Ethos . . .", p. 317.

⁹¹Wolfinger, "Development and Persistence . . .", p. 898.

CHAPTER III

NONPARTISANSHIP IN CANADIAN MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT: HISTORICAL AND DESCRIPTIVE

Introduction

This chapter will deal with the origins and development of nonpartisan politics in Canadian cities. It would appear that two questions must be answered to justify this chapter in the context of the thesis as a whole. Firstly, why is it important to study the nonpartisan politics of Canadian cities? Secondly, why cannot a historical study of nonpartisanship in Canada be incorporated in the chapters on the United States?

The answer to the first question is similar to the justification given for the previous chapter. Namely: a) A study of the forces which gave rise to the nonpartisan style of urban politics is important to an understanding of the hypothesized effects of nonpartisanship; b) it would appear to be important to an understanding of the different political orientations of Canadians toward politics at the different levels of government--i.e., that parties are necessary and legitimate at the senior levels of government but not at the local level; c) it promises to provide reasons for the failure of Canadian cities to follow the British and American examples of partisan local politics; and d) this approach would seem

best in an attempt to determine why nonpartisanship has persisted in most Canadian cities but has been replaced by party control in one major city and persists in different degrees in various other cities. Differential historical experiences in the political life of various cities would seem to offer a more plausible explanation for this than current social or demographic factors.

The answer to the second question in general terms is that the development of nonpartisanship in Canada, while it is similar to that of the United States, is sufficiently different to warrant separate treatment. Specifically, a) Canada never experienced a period of extreme political party control of urban government of the type that flourished in the United States in the latter part of the nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth. The analysis, therefore, must explain why parties did not succeed in Canadian cities rather than (as in the case of the United States) emphasizing the reason for party success and subsequent decline; b) one cannot assume a priori that the ideology of nonpartisanship in Canada is in all respects the same as that of the United States. To do so would imply that the political culture of the two countries is identical. Only an empirical analysis of components of the ideology on both sides of the border will reveal the degree to which they are similar or different; c) the legal and institutional manifestations of nonpartisanship are in some respects different in the two countries and require

different modes of research--for example, the form of ballot, which in the United States is assumed by most writers to reflect effectively partisan or nonpartisan cities, is meaningless as a research tool in Canada where ballots have always been nonpartisan; and d) a final reason for a separate study of nonpartisanship in Canada is that in Canada, where only one city is effectively partisan, research will be more profitable emphasizing the different degrees of nonpartisanship, rather than comparing the effectively partisan and nonpartisan cities which have existed at various periods in the United States.

Early Municipal Development in French Canada

Since the area that was to become Canada was first settled by the French, the search for the origins of nonpartisanship in both its ideological and institutional dimensions is best begun with a study of local government in early French Canada. The most striking feature of this period is that from the founding of Quebec in 1608 until the 1840's--almost two and one half centuries, there were no municipal institutions as such in French Canada. While the French settlers were under the authority of France, local matters were dealt with by Intendent and the Council--sometimes in consultation with the local population. Even after the English conquest, local affairs in each parish in Lower Canada were regulated by the agents of centralized authorities such as the Curé and the Captain of the Militia. This pattern of local government in Lower Canada persisted until 1841.¹ This long period of

autocratic, centralized rule clearly indicates that local autonomy and the popular election of local officials are not part of the French Canadian tradition.

What implications does this early lack of local institutions have for the politics of the cities that have since appeared in the province of Quebec? A number of speculative interpretations can be offered along the lines of Robert Wood's thesis that modern nonpartisan sentiments and institutional arrangements can be attributed to the continuing influence of the values of local autonomy and democracy. He suggests that these values persist in the United States as a legacy from the early American pattern of local government.² Applying Wood's thesis first to the fact that local autonomy was not a factor in early French Canadian experience would suggest that whatever the cause of the traditional nonpartisan politics of Quebec's cities, it does not originate with a nostalgic attachment to local autonomy. In other words, a tradition of local autonomy, according to Wood, results in an antipathy to the interference of major parties in local politics. Since the French have not had a long history of local autonomy, they would not, for this reason at least, be inclined to oppose the entry of provincial or federal parties into local affairs.

The second major characteristic of the early pattern of local affairs in French Canada was the lack of local

democracy (defined by Wood in terms of the election of local government officials). A tradition of local elections, particularly of the town meeting variety, would, in his view, suggest that the people would oppose parties in local affairs because they constitute an artificial barrier to direct voter-candidate ties. Since local government by elected councils does not have a long history in French Canada this factor cannot be given much weight as an influence which has kept the politics of Quebec cities on a nonpartisan basis. This line of argument does not suggest that the lack of local autonomy and democracy in the experience of French Canadians would have a positive influence upon the entry of parties into Quebec urban politics, but it does imply that if parties were to attempt to gain control of civic government, these two factors at least would not constitute an impediment in their entry.

A third factor that may be considered characteristic of French Canada's local affairs during most of its history was the presence of strong traditional authorities. The influence of the Roman Catholic church and the feudal seignorial system was strong in local affairs. According to Greenstein³ the absence of strong traditional authorities controlling local affairs in the United States left a power vacuum which was occupied by the local party machine. Applying Greenstein's argument to the traditional situation of French Canada suggests that the authority of the parish priest, the seigneur and the captain of the Militia in local affairs would

have discouraged the development of parties in local government. Indeed, it is consistent with this interpretation that the first appearance of effective partisan control in Montreal in 1960 exactly coincided with the beginning of the "quiet revolution" which marked a distinct shift from the traditional parish-oriented values. The coincidence of these two events cannot, however, be taken as proof of a causal connection between them.

Early Municipal Development in English Canada

The development of nonpartisan sentiments and institutions in Canada must take into account the history of the English-speaking settlements in addition to the French if a complete picture is to be given. It seems best to focus on the development of municipal institutions and ideas in Upper Canada (now Ontario) since Upper Canada was the first colony to establish a comprehensive municipal system and it is this system which established the pattern for municipal development in the rest of Canada.⁴

Until late in the nineteenth century, local government in Upper Canada "was carried on chiefly by the ancient English system of local magistrates meeting in Courts of Quarter Sessions."⁵ This system prevailed even longer in other parts of Canada--in Nova Scotia, for example, it was not abandoned until 1879.⁶ Under the so-called Quarter Sessions, all the affairs of local government--legislative, administrative, and

judicial--were carried on by justices of the peace appointed by the central governing authority.

The development of elective municipal bodies which eventually replaced this system of government by session has been attributed largely to the influence of large numbers of United Empire Loyalists who immigrated to Upper Canada and other British colonies at the time of the American Revolution. The impact of the massive influx of Loyalists is suggested by the number of newcomers in proportion to the sparse population of the British colonies. For example, about 20,000 Loyalists settled in Upper Canada during this period; approximately 10,000 settled in the New Brunswick area and about 25,000 came to Nova Scotia, effectively doubling the population of that colony.⁷

Ironically, the "loyalty" of the new settlers did not include an attachment to the British system of local government. H.F. Angus points out that the existing municipal institutions of Ontario are largely the result of the insistence of Loyalists for local government in the New England tradition.⁸ Crawford indicates that about "three-quarters of the Loyalists who came to Canada were from the colony of New York where the local institutions were of the New England type."⁹ The two principal goals of Loyalists were to introduce into the practice of local government the cardinal tenets of autonomy and democracy that had prevailed in the settlements along the

American seaboard.¹⁰

These two values of local autonomy and democracy translated into tangible demands for incorporation of local units and the right to elect local officials. These demands brought some results. In 1793, the town meeting was legalized in Upper Canada, but with no real legislative powers.¹¹ Thirty-six years later, in his influential report on British North America, Lord Durham recommended the establishment of elective municipal institutions and in doing so referred to the municipal systems of some American states.¹²

The Loyalist influence is suggested by the fact that the powers of the Courts of Quarter Sessions was transferred to elected municipal bodies in 1841, preceding by about fifty years a similar democratization of local government in Britain.¹³ The formal transfer of authority to elective councils was accomplished by the District Councils Act of 1841, passed under the guidance of Lord Sydenham, the first governor of the United Canadas. In 1849, the Act was amended somewhat and was passed as the Municipal Act of 1849, better known as the Baldwin Act. The Baldwin Act has been called the "Magna Charta" of municipal government in Canada because, despite many amendments, it still constitutes the framework of Ontario local government today and has provided the foundation upon which the municipal system in almost every other Canadian province has been built.¹⁴

The Baldwin Act of 1849 provided comprehensive municipal legislation in Upper Canada which permitted the local self-government of towns, cities, and townships and also gave these units considerable freedom from central control.¹⁵ Similar legislation was not so easily introduced into Lower Canada due to the reluctance of the French population to accept arrangements that were not compatible with their traditions. In 1840, for example, an ordinance passed by the government of the United Canadas establishing elective institutions in Lower Canada was repealed five years later because of the "resistance of the people they were designed to serve."¹⁶ Nevertheless, in keeping with the policy of the Governor of the United Canadas, municipal institutions were imposed upon the reluctant population of Lower Canada from above. In 1885, the Municipal and Road Act established a system of popularly elected bodies in parishes, townships, towns and villages very similar to the legislation that had been passed in Upper Canada in 1841.¹⁷ Comparative legislation incorporating the principles of autonomy and democracy at the local level was copied by other provinces somewhat later. The Atlantic provinces, for example, followed suit in the 1870's and 1880's.¹⁸

The four western provinces copied the American inspired system from Ontario as well. Manitoba, in 1883, passed comprehensive municipal legislation patterned after the Ontario model of incorporated, elective local units. When Alberta and Saskatchewan became provinces in 1905, they

inherited an elective municipal system which had been introduced when the area had only territorial status. The Municipal Clauses Act of 1892, which established the municipal system in British Columbia, was also patterned after the Ontario model.¹⁹ The imitation of Ontario's municipal system by the western provinces is explained by Crawford as a natural development, since Ontario's system "was the nearest established system in Canada . . . (and) great numbers of early settlers came from Ontario."²⁰ An earlier observer, Samuel Wickett, suggests an additional reason:

In the west, Ontario, Manitoba, British Columbia and the Northwest (later Saskatchewan and Alberta) represent a tolerably uniform area. Owing largely to the fact that so many Ontario men have accepted municipal appointments or entered upon the practise of law in its (Canada's) leading cities, the municipal system of Ontario has in many respects served as a model.²¹

This review of early municipal development in Canada indicates not only that the traditions of local autonomy and democracy were strong but that these influences came to Canada from the Colonial towns of the United States via the United Empire Loyalists. If, as Robert Wood maintains, the persistent anti-party feelings on which nonpartisan politics is based is a legacy from these two traditions, then the prevailing nonpartisan sentiments of Canadians can be attributed in part to an idealization of the local autonomy and democracy of their small-town forefathers. This can hardly be the whole explanation, however. These same sentiments did not prevent

the widespread control by political parties of urban councils in American cities.

Influence of the American Municipal Reform Movement - General

If the combined influence of the traditions of local autonomy and democracy do not explain why Canadian cities did not undergo a period of extensive party control in civic government, what other factors explain why they skipped this partisan stage in their development? The literature on Canadian local government is virtually unanimous in attributing the absence of the period of machine politics in Canada largely to the fact that rapid urbanization occurred in Canada later than in the United States. John Joyce makes this point succinctly in his recent study of Canadian municipal politics. He points out that Canada's period of rapid urban growth coincided with the reform era in the United States. For example, the Canadian urban population increased from 18 percent to 41.8 percent of the total population between 1871 and 1911.²² It was during this period that the chorus of the municipal reform movement reached its highest pitch. Joyce suggests that

(c)ivic leaders and provincial legislators quite naturally looked to the United States for some guidelines to cope with what was a new phenomenon for Canada. In spite of the fact that the socio-cultural basis causing the reform movement in the United States did not exist in Canada, reform philosophy appealed to the conservative, business-oriented mentality of the establishment governing Canada at that time.²³

Kaplan supports this view. He remarks that Canadian cities did not experience a period of party control followed by a nonpartisan reaction but that they "seem to have skipped a stage and moved directly to a consensus on good government values."²⁴

Evidence offered by Donald Rowat adds weight to this interpretation. He stresses the point that province-wide systems of municipal government were only established in the central provinces in the mid-nineteenth century and in the Maritimes and the West not until long after confederation. The Canadian nonpartisan tradition "was imported near the end of the last century after the local non-partisan movement in the United States had become strong."²⁵

The impact of the reform ideals is evident from the antipathy toward local party politics held by Canadian civic leaders as well as ordinary citizens near the turn of the century. For example, this nonpartisan sentiment in Canada during the reform era is documented in a speech given by W.D. Lighthall, Mayor of Westmount and honorary secretary of the Union of Canadian Municipalities to a 1917 meeting of the National Municipal League. He stated:

In Canada . . . a party ticket in municipal affairs is unknown. The mere suggestion of party strife entering into the matter would arouse strong opposition among the voters. . . . (I)t is a fair statement that the elimination of party politics is a universally accepted sentiment. It is supported by all the leading newspapers

and is strongly in favour with all classes of people. . . .
In Canada it rests upon a habit of public mind acquired
during the past half century. . . .²⁶

Samuel Wickett of the University of Toronto adds his view to Lighthall's statements. Writing in 1902, he asserts that "public opinion in Canada has thus far been opposed to the introduction of party politics into municipal matters."²⁷ The Municipal Auditor of the Government of Ontario expressed a typical viewpoint on party politics in 1912:

. . . (P)arty conventions and politics have not a predominant influence in municipal affairs (in Ontario), and they never will have, so long as citizens are alert to protect the best interests of the city against the intrigues of ambitious politicians.²⁸

Harold Kaplan suggests that Canadian fears about local parties even today are based on the image of the corrupt machine that existed in American cities around 1900.²⁹

Early Reform Influences in Western Canada

The nonpartisan ideals of the American reform movement were particularly strong in the Canadian West where hordes of Americans from the plains states poured over the border, attracted by the offer of free land. Almost a million Americans, mostly from the Progressive stronghold of the American plains, came to the Canadian prairies between 1898 and 1914.³⁰ They brought with them the anti-party attitude characteristic of the Progressive movement in the United States.³¹

A militant farmer's organization known as the Patrons

of Industry became popular in Western Canada and Ontario and Quebec after the 1880's. At the high point of the Patrons' influence in 1894 they reported 50,000 members and had a few candidates elected to provincial office. Their ideology favoured the entry of farmers into politics but only on a 'nonpartisan' basis. Like other farmers' groups, the Patrons pressed for action on railway rates and storage of produce but they also emphasized producer and consumer co-operatives, prohibition, the initiative and referendum and other reforms.³² In addition, they stressed the familiar reform idea that government is a matter of business and that the presence of political parties only hinders the achievement of efficiency and economy in public affairs. A declaration in the 1896 edition of the Patrons' Advocate suggests their view:

It is especially important to get rid of out of date party methods and procedures. . . . The cost of legislation and administration can be largely reduced by the application of business methods to public matters.³³

Another organization of American origin added to the nonpartisan sentiment in the Canadian west early in this century. The Non-Partisan League which was founded in North Dakota spread rapidly into the western Great Plains region of the United States and into Saskatchewan and Alberta, where its influence was felt particularly in the period between 1916 and 1922. By 1917, the League was publishing two weekly newspapers in Saskatchewan where it attained widespread rural

support. Its success was particularly evident in Alberta, where it elected two candidates to the provincial legislature in 1917. The influence of the League was important in the establishment of the Progressive Party in 1920 and in the policies of the United Farmers of Alberta. McPherson reports that the Non-Partisan League's main aim was to replace the prevailing party system with a business government which would deal with issues according to their merits and not on party considerations. Morton characterizes their philosophy as emphasizing "a repudiation of party politics".³⁴

Absence of a Base for Party Politics in Early Canadian Cities

The preceding section has suggested that the influence of the American reform movement was mainly responsible for the absence of political party entry into civic politics during the period of rapid urbanization in Canada. This explanation, however, does not answer the question: Why did parties not appear on the local scene prior to rapid urbanization? Generally, the answer appears to be that the preconditions that spawned the party machine in United States cities did not exist, or existed to a much lesser degree, in Canadian communities.

Firstly, Canadian cities lacked the disorganized and decentralized political structure that American cities had inherited from the age of Jackson. The system of checks and balances did not work its way into Canadian local government

to any great extent, and the practice of electing local administrative and judicial officials with the accompanying long ballot was never employed. These Jacksonian innovations prevented effective organization and coordination, virtually paralyzing the effective governing of cities in the United States at the very time that the increasing size and complexity were creating more demands for government action. It was this need for strong, centralized civic authority that the political machine filled.

A second reason for the absence of political parties in Canadian municipalities even before the reform era is suggested by the fact that Canadian municipalities were not as large as their American counterparts. In small communities it is more likely that the voter will know the candidates personally and "the politics of acquaintance" that prevails is not likely to be replaced by party politics.³⁶ Small communities, moreover, obviously have less "spoils" to attract the party machine.

The relative lack of patronage that characterized early local government in Canada compared to the United States likely discouraged the major parties from entering the municipal field. In Canadian municipalities, the tradition has long been that appointed officials hold office during good behavior.³⁷ Moreover, Canadian provincial governments exercised tighter control over their embryonic local governments than was the

case with state control over the more established American cities.³⁸ Wickett suggests that this tighter control on the part of Canadian provinces resulted in "certain regulations as to municipal patronage through which political spoils are in part shielded from local politicians and in part removed to the more suitable (sic) field of the province."³⁹

Canadian cities also lacked the large immigrant population that contributed to the rise of the urban political machine in the United States. At the time that the urban bosses in the United States were thriving on the large immigrant vote, Canadian cities were remarkably homogeneous. For example, in 1881 Canada's population (excluding the French, who composed about a third of the population but were confined largely to Quebec) was 96.7 percent of British origin. Wickett points out that in 1891, in eight of Canada's larger cities, the foreign-born population averaged only 5.6 percent of the total; the comparable figure for fifty of the larger American cities was 30.8 percent foreign-born.⁴⁰ By the time Canadian cities had sizeable immigrant populations, the tide of reform had become firmly established in Canada and provided a barrier to party entry.

Specific Reform Influences on Nonpartisanship in Canada

When the effects of urban growth began to be felt in Canada, Canadian officials went shopping in the United States for ideas and techniques to enable them to solve their urban

problems. They found that the Americans were blaming most of their urban ills on the pernicious effects of political parties. As a result, the Canadians came home indoctrinated with anti-party ideas and they brought with them techniques for reforming municipal institutions that were designed largely for the purpose of eliminating party control of local governments. This process appears to have been concentrated during the municipal reform period.

In 1888, a Commission on Municipal Institutions appointed by Ontario chose to concentrate its search for innovations in local government on the United States rather than Britain or Europe. The Commissioners explained that "the circumstances of the people in that country more nearly resemble our own in urban and rural districts, and we may reasonably conclude that whatever works satisfactorily amongst them is not wholly unsuited to us."⁴¹ In 1913, a British Columbia Royal Commission on Municipal Government appointed by the government of that province reported that it had studied the institutional form of twelve cities in the United States but only seven in Canada.⁴²

It is important to note that many institutional innovations and explicit anti-party legislation that American reformers effected at home had little relevance for Canada, where the political parties were not in control of civic government. The form of the ballot was a case in point--the ballot had never been partisan in Canada nor had it ever been

"long" (in the sense that administrative and judicial offices were filled by balloting). Legislation designed to remove the label was not seen in Canada. Similarly, Canada has not adopted the nonpartisan primary nor has it passed legislation to separate the dates of the civic elections from those of the province or federal government--the dates of local elections have practically never conflicted with election dates for senior levels of government.⁴³

Both the ideology of nonpartisanship and some of its institutional correlates have, however, been adopted in Canada despite the legal and social differences between the two countries. Although the anti-party sentiments and institutional arrangements were designed to "throw the rascals out" in American cities, these factors obviously did not have this effect in Canada where the party "rascals" were not in control of civic government. There is evidence, however, that manifestations of both dimensions of nonpartisanship imported from the United States contributed significantly to discouraging the entry of parties into the municipal field, especially provincial and federal parties.

An American organization, the National Municipal League, an effective and consistent fighter for reform, helped spread both the nonpartisan ideology and institutions into Canada. In 1913 it held its twenty-first National Conference for Good City Government in Toronto, the only one ever held

outside the United States.⁴⁴ The same year the League voted to affiliate with the International Municipal League, an organization sponsored by the mayor of Westmount which was designed to increase communication among municipal governments in the United States, Canada, and other countries.⁴⁵ F.M. Stewart points out that at this time the League was answering inquiries from foreign countries and sending its literature to them.⁴⁶ The pivotal role played by the League is suggested by the remarks of a representative of the Union of Canada municipalities:

In that intercommunication which is of late years constantly taking place between the municipalities of the United States and those of Canada, largely through the National Municipal League and the Union of Canadian Municipalities . . . our cities usually look to yours for experience.⁴⁷

The Commission plan for city government which originated in the United States was adopted by a number of municipalities in Canada in the first two decades of the twentieth century. The key features of the plan--a small council elected at large on a nonpartisan ballot with each Commissioner responsible for a separate municipal department--was even more irrelevant to Canada than the United States. It was designed to centralize authority (but had the effect of decentralizing it)⁴⁸ and to eliminate partisan control of city government. Canadian cities, however, did not suffer from excessive decentralization of authority and there were no parties to eliminate. The plan was soon abandoned completely in Canada.⁴⁹

A new plan for city government, the manager plan (or council-manager plan), made a much greater impact upon Canada. The rationale of this American originated form makes a sharp distinction between policy and administration. The plan implies that most of the problems at the civic level are matters of administration--to be solved by the principles of efficiency and economy of the business world. Hence a professional appointed manager is put in charge of civic affairs. Political parties are explicitly excluded by proponents of the plan--the council is to be elected at-large on a nonpartisan ballot. Parties only interfere with the efficiency of civic administration; the one best solution to each civic problem can be found by "rational", "professional" procedures.⁵⁰ This plan originated in the United States in 1910 and was rapidly adopted by municipalities on both sides of the border. It received sustained promotion by the National Municipal League and the International City Managers Association.⁵¹ Munro reports that the manager-plan received vigorous promotion in Canada: "An energetic propaganda for the further extension of this plan in Canada is now being carried on . . . in part through the agency of the International City Manager's Association."⁵² The first Canadian municipality to adopt the manager plan was Westmount in 1913⁵³ and by 1925 six Canadian cities in three provinces employed the plan.⁵⁴ By 1954, it had spread to thirty-five municipalities in six provinces,⁵⁵ by 1966 it was in use in 82 Canadian communities⁵⁶ and it is present in almost one hundred cities⁵⁷ today.

In actual fact, the manager type of municipal organization and the "administrative" rationale it implies is more widespread than the above figures indicate. A plan that is practically identical to the manager form, found mainly in Western Canada, is the commissioner type, also known as the "council-city commissioner system" or the "council-board of commissioners system".⁵⁸ This plan is not to be confused with the commission form used early in the century, where the commissioners were elected and together formed the council. The commissioner in the council-commissioner system is an appointed official with the same powers as a city manager. Canadian authorities point out that this latter plan is almost identical in operation and intent to the manager plan.⁵⁹ As with the manager plan, the commissioner form makes a sharp distinction between policy and administration. The commissioner is an appointed professional who is responsible for the administration of local affairs. In some cases a board of approximately three commissioners is responsible for the "management" of civic affairs. In some cities, like Edmonton and Calgary, the mayor is also a member of the commission board, but even here the management rests with the appointed members of the board: "(T)he mayor . . . does not function as an administrative official, but rather as a liaison official between council and the board of commissioners, this type is practically identical with the council-manager system."⁶⁰ As indicated above, Edmonton and Calgary have the board of

commissioners system. Regina also has this form. Rowat reports that Saskatoon and Moose Jaw each employ one appointed commissioner⁶¹ and Plunkett reports that the commissioner form was recently adopted by Vancouver.⁶²

The manager plan and the analogous commissioner plan are concrete indications of the widespread influence of the "reform package" in Canada. Along with the manager plan, the at-large election and the nonpartisan ballot expressed a common sentiment--namely, that local government involves mainly the administration of services and therefore should be managed not by political parties but by appointed experts. Joyce found that "the acceptance of this philosophy is almost universal in Canada."⁶³ The example of the business principles of "efficiency and economy" was part of this "syndrome of local political orientation."⁶⁴

As early as 1909, the former mayor of Red Deer, in a speech to the Union of Alberta municipalities, advocated the adoption of the manager plan. After quoting President Eliot of Harvard University to the effect that local government is "absolutely" a matter of business, he went on, "(W)hether dividend to shareholders or the greatest material advantages to ratepayers is the object sought after, the principle is the same and . . . the methods which have proved successful in accomplishing the one aim will prove as effective in accomplishing the other."⁶⁵

Another indication of the "local government is administration" strain in the nonpartisan ideology of Canadians can be seen in the constitution of the Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities. It states, "The purpose of this organization shall be: to increase the efficiency and raise the standard of municipal administration through out the Dominion."⁶⁶ A study involving the interviewing of all aldermen and mayors of Edmonton between 1964 and 1967 reveals not only the degree to which local politicians see civic government as administration, but how closely this sentiment is linked to the question of local partisanship. Blake found that "most of them were opposed to parties at the local level--'cities provide mainly services' was a representative reply."⁶⁷ A survey of the Edmonton electorate in 1968 also revealed that 41.2 percent of a sample of the residents of that city were of the opinion that "a city is like a business and should be run by appointed managers rather than by elected politicians."⁶⁸

Nonpartisanship--The Prevailing Pattern

Both dimensions of nonpartisanship, ideological and institutional, remain strong in Canada. The institutional manifestations of the nonpartisan sentiment can be seen by the proliferation of reform devices--the city-manager and commissioner form, the semi-independent authorities and special purpose agencies, referendums on decisions involving large expenditure and at-large elections or elections by large strip wards. Similarly, there is ample evidence that in the past

and more recently both the citizens and politicians in Canada have been strongly nonpartisan. This evidence refutes a recent observation by Charles Adrian that nonpartisanship "seems to be a uniquely American ideology."⁶⁹ George Mooney, Executive Director of the Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities, observed in 1960 that "the practise of candidates running for office with avowed national or provincial party affiliations is frowned upon."⁷⁰ A more recent survey of local officials across Canada found that they expressed "a strongly held belief" that parties are undesirable at the local level.⁷¹ The press, too, has until recently opposed party politics at the local level. An editorial in the Edmonton Journal in 1945 stated in part:

(F)or years the Edmonton Journal has protested and opposed any appearance of a federal or provincial party in Municipal elections. Edmonton voters have shown consistently that they too are not in favor of such party intrusion into the municipal field.⁷²

Kaplan reports that in most provinces, the major parties have considered but rejected the idea of entry into civic politics, fearing a voter backlash.⁷³ Although many civic candidates are affiliated with national or provincial parties, they downplay their affiliations and their party ties do not appear to influence their voting on council.⁷⁴

Degrees of Partisanship/Nonpartisanship

Despite the fact that the politics of most Canadian

cities can be described as "nonpartisan", nonpartisanship, as Adrian has pointed out is often a matter of degree. A concluding section appears to be in order to examine the degree of partisanship/nonpartisanship of Canadian cities. According to the modification of Kaplan's typology elaborated earlier, cities can be classified into three categories--a) partisan (in which a disciplined political party controls council policy-making), b) factional (in which groups or slates coalesce for election purposes but (i) do not practice disciplined voting on council, or (ii) do not control a majority of council, or (iii) both) and c) nonfactional (in which each candidate runs his own campaign).

Canada apparently has only one effectively partisan city--Montreal. In 1960 the Civic Party captured a majority of seats and has retained its control ever since. It was initially elected, according to Plunkett, on the strength of its program which emphasized an end to crime and corruption in Montreal.⁷⁵ The Civic Party runs on a comprehensive, widely publicized platform, it caucuses before council meetings and controls council by voting as a bloc.⁷⁶ The success of party politics in Montreal has been attributed to a number of factors. Joyce declares that the executive committee system used in Montreal (which is analogous to a cabinet) has encouraged party control. The executive committee is chosen from among the members of council much as a Prime Minister chooses his cabinet from the members of parliament.⁷⁷ It is difficult

to see why this practice would necessarily lead to the development of parties. In early Canadian local government, it was commonly the practise that councillors chose one of their number as mayor. It is difficult also to see how choosing the executive committee differs much from the practise in council-committee cities (where the mayor is weak) of choosing chairmen for the more powerful committees. Kaplan implies that the ethnic conflict in Montreal might provide the social cleavage on which political parties can thrive.⁷⁸ An alternative hypothesis can be suggested. Possibly the French language and French-Canadian "political culture" constituted a barrier to the penetration of the reform influences coming from the United States and English-speaking Canada. For example, no evidence was found in the literature reviewed here which suggests that the modern French-Canadians share with English-speaking Canadians the view that civic government is a mere matter of administration.

English-speaking Canada presents a different picture with regard to degrees of nonpartisanship. "Factional" politics apparently became common in the 1920's and 1930's and coincided with the rise of socialist labor-oriented political movements. These social reform groups were confronted by property owners groups, each supporting a competing slate of candidates. In some cases overt entry by the C.C.F. would activate local Liberals, Conservatives, and Social Crediters, who would set up opposing slates.⁷⁹

Often the slate-making groups or factions were motivated by explicit anti-party sentiment. For example, the Civic Election Committee in Winnipeg was formed by local businessmen to counter the influence of left-wing groups such as the Independent Labour Party and the Communist Labour Election Committee which were active in that city.⁸⁰ Donnelly reports that the Civic Election Committee in Winnipeg which is dominated by owners of valuable real estate sponsors "good" (non-socialist) candidates by open endorsement and provides them with campaign funds.⁸¹ Similarly, the Non-Partisan Association in Vancouver, which was founded in 1936 to counter the activity of socialist forces in city politics, espouses (as its name implies) an explicit anti-party philosophy.⁸² The Home Owners Association in Regina, founded in 1936, was likewise a slate-making body set up to oppose the depression-era socialist groups.⁸³ Betts reports that the members of the Civic Government Association in Edmonton maintained that their group was in no way a political party and that party politics was not appropriate for municipal politics.⁸⁴ Moreover, the business-oriented faction in Edmonton politics usually changes its name from one election to the next.⁸⁵ Effectively partisan politics has not appeared in Western Canada, possibly because the socialist-labour groups have apparently never gained control of local councils and the "good-government" slate-making organizations have been "loosely organized alliances, seeking to elect certain types of candidates (non-Socialist, non-Labour candidates) but not seeking to become governing parties."⁸⁶

They do not attempt to effect disciplined, bloc voting on council--voting on council is "personal and unpredictable".⁸⁷

The third type of local politics which exists in Canada is the "nonfactional" variety. In this type of city "each candidate runs his own separate campaign . . . and refuses to link his name with any other candidates" and voting on council is not structured.⁸⁸ This type is apparently more prevalent in Canada than even the "factional" variety. Kaplan's observations lead him to this conclusion. He found, for example, that cities such as Toronto (until recently), Calgary, Hamilton, Ottawa and Windsor were nonfactional and he asserts that "Canada apparently contains a larger percentage of nonfactional cities than does the United States."⁸⁹ Joyce and Hosse's findings support Kaplan's view that there are more nonfactional than factional cities in Canada. In his 1969 survey of seventy cities (mostly over 30,000 population) the replies indicated that in 40 of these cities no political groups ran or supported candidates.⁹⁰

An important question about the degree of nonpartisanship is posed by the literature reviewed above. Why do some nonpartisan cities in Canada have slate competition while others do not? In other words, what factors determine whether a city will be more or less partisan? The factional city is, of course, more partisan (less nonpartisan) than the nonfactional city which can be considered the most "pure" variety

of nonpartisan politics.

Possibly, the reason that some cities have not until recently experienced factional politics is that they do not have a history of radical socialist or labour movements. As Kaplan points out, Winnipeg and Vancouver have had politically active labour movements in the past⁹¹ which, as indicated above, began the competition for city council. Toronto, lacking this history, has only developed factions in its local elections during the last few years.

Another factor which may in part explain the different degrees of nonpartisanship in various cities in the differential social homogeneity of the respective cities. The hypothesis here would be that socially heterogeneous communities provide the necessary social cleavage for the existence of factions--whereas homogeneous communities lack the social cleavages that are made tangible by the competing factions. Unfortunately, none of the literature deals with this hypothesis on an empirical basis.

Recent Trends and Future Developments

The analysis of nonpartisanship in Canada would be incomplete without an account of the trend toward the more partisan variety of politics which has occurred during the past few years. A detailed examination of this trend will possibly provide an indication of the direction of future

developments in Canadian local politics.

The most striking recent development has been the increase in local and major party activity in many Canadian cities. The impetus for this mushrooming of "factional" politics has been traced by some writers⁹² to the impact of the Civic Party's success in Montreal in 1960. Some support for this view is given by the fact that local factions attempting to gain control of council mushroomed in Quebec shortly after Drapeau's victory. For example, the Civic Progress Party was formed in Quebec City in 1962, the Civic Party appeared in Rimouski in 1968, and local factions were organized in Longueuil in 1966 and in Laval and St. Adele in 1969.⁹³ However, it would appear that influences other than the example set by Montreal were at work, for local factions as well as civic arms of major parties appeared in communities far removed, both geographically and culturally, from Montreal. For example, local factions appeared in 1966 in Edmonton (Better Civic Government Committee) and in Oshawa; in 1967 in Toronto the City Council Co-operative was formed; in 1968 a faction was formed in St. James and Brandon in Manitoba; and 1969 saw the founding of the Lakehead Good Government Association.⁹⁴ In 1969, also, the New Democratic Party and the Liberals made their much publicized entry into Toronto local politics. During 1969, Joyce and Hosse report that six "national civic parties" (federal or provincial party organizations competing in local politics) were formed.⁹⁵ Additional evidence of

major party interest in local elections may be seen in the decisions during the past two years of the provincial New Democratic Party organizations in Saskatchewan and Ontario to allow constituency organizations to enter local politics.⁹⁶

The trend to a greater degree of partisan activity in Canada can possibly be attributed to some extent to the increase in concern with "urban problems" and the "crisis of the cities" which has received much publicity during the past decade. The problems of violence, pollution, housing shortages, transportation and so on in the United States and Canada have been presented in the media largely as an urban malaise. The increasing awareness that all is not well in the city has apparently contributed to a growing disenchantment with urban governments.⁹⁷ It appears that the politically active members of Canadian cities are attempting to capitalize on the issues of the "urban crisis" to gain civic office. Possibly their motives are mixed--they may be genuinely concerned about urban problems and hope to solve them through political channels but as Fowler and Goldrick indicate, they also see in the increasingly important and controversial civic arena a relevant goal for their political ambitions.⁹⁸ The decision of the major party elites to enter the 1969 Toronto civic election, Fowler and Goldrick maintain, "was not made in response to popular demand, though on that score, the political elites may well have confused their own voices,

amplified by the Toronto press, for those of the people."⁹⁹

The trend toward increasing involvement at the local level by major parties and local groups has increased the degree of partisanship in Canadian cities but it would seem it has yet to achieve very significant results. In other words, the local slates and political parties are still at the "factional stage"--only Montreal has an effectively partisan form of politics in the sense that council policies are controlled by the party. Party success in the Toronto election in 1969 was less than spectacular. The Liberals and the New Democratic parties between them only elected five official candidates to the twenty-three positions on council.¹⁰⁰ Similarly, in Thunder Bay, the entry by the New Democratic Party into the 1969 election resulted in a mere 10 percent of the popular vote for that party with no members elected to council.¹⁰¹

The lack of success by major parties overtly contesting local office can be attributed to several factors. One of these is obviously that the parties themselves are often split on the question of overtly entering the campaign. In Toronto, for example, prior to the 1969 election, two-thirds of the "nonpartisan" group (CIVAC) were Liberals, many of whom were active in the party at other levels and they opposed their party's move to run a party slate against them.¹⁰² The N.D.P. in Toronto similarly was split by the fact that a

member of the party, William Denison, sought and won the mayoralty as a nonpartisan--disavowing any connection with the N.D.P. group seeking local office.¹⁰³ The existence of nonpartisan incumbents who are members of parties at the senior levels of government thus serves to dilute a concerted party assault on civic office. In the case of the Conservative party, the presence of many of their members as incumbents in Toronto largely influenced that party's decision to stay out of the 1969 election.¹⁰⁴ In Edmonton, the fact that self-proclaimed "nonpartisan" mayor is a long-time member of the provincial N.D.P. may explain the reluctance of the party elite to enter civic politics on a party basis.¹⁰⁵ Incumbent mayors and aldermen in nonpartisan elective office are usually opposed to party politics in local affairs probably because they recognize that in a nonpartisan system, incumbents are rarely defeated¹⁰⁶ and because they do not wish to lose the votes of persons who identify with rival parties at the senior levels of government. Kaplan reports that this latter motive existed in Toronto prior to the decision of the Liberals and N.D.P. to enter the contest. "It was customary for both candidates and parties to deny that any party assistance was being provided. The candidate hoped to benefit both from the assistance of one party and from the support of voters affiliated with other parties."¹⁰⁷ Senior political parties have been discouraged from entering local elections (with a few recent exceptions) largely due to fear of a voter backlash. Thus

Kaplan reports that in Toronto until the late 1960's, "the parties felt that the public was hostile to partisan intervention and would react against the first party that overtly intervened."¹⁰⁸ He found also that in most provinces major parties "have considered but rejected entrance into municipal politics" out of fear of voter reaction.¹⁰⁹ Donald Rowat observes also that although there is a trend toward greater party involvement in civic elections, "the nonpartisan tradition is still so strong that civic candidates hesitate to use a party label."¹¹⁰

Despite the trend toward major party involvement in civic elections, the parties have yet to demonstrate any spectacular measure of success. The widespread antipathy toward local party politics which appears to be a major impediment to party success has been indicated by some more careful research in addition to the impressionistic evidence cited above. Fowler and Goldrick's research on the Toronto election of 1969 indicates, for example, that even in wards where the voters were offered a straightforward party choice most of them chose not to structure their votes accordingly. Instead, most voters preferred to "split" their vote among the parties, presumably voting "for the man" rather than the party.¹¹¹ An unpublished survey of the Edmonton public conducted by Robert Gilsdorf in 1968 also revealed a continuing voter antipathy to local partisanship. Most respondents were opposed to

party politics in their city.¹¹²

A further indication is given by the continuing low voter turnout in local elections relative to the percentage voting in provincial or federal levels.¹¹³ Many voters likely refrain from participation at the local level for a variety of reasons--many nonvoters likely perceive local government as administration pure and simple;¹¹⁴ some probably perceive the civic government as a less important decision-making centre than the provincial or national governments.¹¹⁵ Whatever the factors that determine the local political orientations of Canadians, Adrian's statement that "the popularity of nonpartisanship remains undiminished" in the United States¹¹⁶ would appear to apply equally well to Canada. The move by major parties toward local involvement in some Canadian cities would seem to require a popular political reorientation if they are to achieve an appreciable measure of success.

FOOTNOTES, CHAPTER III

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³Fred I. Greenstein, "The Changing Pattern of Urban Party Politics", Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 353 (May, 1964).

⁴Theodore A. Hunt, "Recent Canadian Municipal Progress", The Canadian Municipal Journal, IX (September, 1913), 352; Samuel M. Wickett, ed., City Government in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Studies: History and Economics, II, 1902), p. 7.

⁵Fred Landon, Western Ontario and the American Frontier (Toronto: McLelland and Stewart, 1967), p. 221.

⁶C. Bruce Fergusson, Local Government in Nova Scotia (Halifax: Dalhousie University Institute of Public Affairs, 1961), p. 10.

⁷Crawford, Canadian Municipal Government, p. 21.

⁸H.F. Angus, Canada and Her Great Neighbour (Toronto, 1938), p. 48. Quoted in Crawford, Canadian Municipal Government, p. 16.

⁹Crawford, Canadian Municipal Government, p. 22.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 22; Wood, Suburbia, Chapter 2.

¹¹Landon, Western Ontario, p. 221.

¹²Ibid., p. 223; H.L. Brittain, Local Government in Canada (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1951), p. 1.

- ¹³Crawford, Canadian Municipal Government, pp. 30-31.
- ¹⁴Ibid., p. 32; Hunt, "Recent Canadian . . .", p. 352; Donald C. Rowat, Your Local Government (Toronto: The MacMillan Company of Canada, 1962), p. 12; and Landon, Western Ontario, p. 224.
- ¹⁵Rowat, Your Local Government, p. 12.
- ¹⁶Crawford, Canadian Municipal Government, pp. 34-36.
- ¹⁷Ibid.
- ¹⁸W.L. Morton, The Kingdom of Canada (Toronto: McLelland and Stewart, Limited, 1963), p. 287.
- ¹⁹Crawford, Canadian Municipal Government, pp. 42-47; and Rowat, Your Local Government, p. 13.
- ²⁰Crawford, Canadian Municipal Government, pp. 46-47.
- ²¹Wickett, City Government in Canada, p. 7.
- ²²L.E. Stone, Urban Development in Canada (Ottawa: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1967), p. 4. Cited in J.G. Joyce and H.A. Hosse, Civic Parties in Canada (Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities, 1970), pp. 1 and 3.
- ²³John G. Joyce, "Municipal Political Parties in Canada", Master's thesis, University of Western Ontario, 1969, pp. 25-26.
- ²⁴Harold Kaplan, "Politics and Policy-Making in Metropolitan Toronto", Canadian Journal of Political Science, XXXI (November, 1965), p. 551.
- ²⁵Rowat, Your Local Government, pp. 34-35.
- ²⁶W.D. Lighthall, "The Elimination of Political Parties in Canadian Cities", National Municipal Review, VI (March, 1917), pp. 207-209.
- ²⁷Wickett, City Government in Canada, p. 10.

²⁸Paul F. Sharp, The Agrarian Revolt in Western Canada (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1948), p. 274.

²⁹Harold Kaplan, The Regional City: Politics and Planning in Metropolitan Areas (Toronto: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 1965), p. 30.

³⁰Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955), p. 53.

³¹Sharp, Agrarian Revolt, p. 5.

³²Morton, Kingdom of Canada, p. 383; and Dean E. McHenry, The Third Force in Canada (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1950), pp. 7-8.

³³Quoted in M.S. Donnelly, The Government of Manitoba (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), p. 104.

³⁴Morton, Kingdom of Canada, p. 433; C.B. MacPherson, Democracy in Alberta (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1953), pp. 25-26; and S.M. Lipsett, Agrarian Socialism (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1950), pp. 13, 55.

³⁵Thomas F. Plunkett, Urban Canada and Its Government: A Study of Municipal Organization (Toronto: MacMillan of Canada, Limited, 1968), p. 47; and Brittain, Local Government, p. 17.

³⁶Joyce and Hosse, Civic Parties, pp. 1-2; and Adrian and Press, Governing Urban America, third edition (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968), p. 14.

³⁷Wickett, City Government in Canada, p. 10.

³⁸Kaplan, "Politics and Policy-Making . . .", p. 551.

³⁹Wickett, City Government in Canada, pp. 10-11.

⁴⁰Ibid., pp. 9-10.

⁴¹Quoted in Brittain, Local Government in Canada, p. 13.

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³Wickett, City Government in Canada, p. 10.

⁴⁴Frank M. Stewart, A Half Century of Municipal Reform: The History of the National Municipal League (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1950), p. 164.

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷W.D. Lighthall, "War Time Experiences of Canadian Cities", National Municipal Review, VII (January, 1918), p. 19.

⁴⁸Greenstein, "The Changing Patterns . . .", p. 4.

⁴⁹J.A. Corry, Democratic Government and Politics, second edition (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1951), p. 610.

⁵⁰Crawford, Canadian Municipal Government, p. 169; D.S. Wright, "The City Manager as a Developmental Administrator", in Robert T. Doland, ed., Comparative Urban Research (Beverly Hills: Sage Publication, 1969).

⁵¹Stewart, A Half Century, p. 75.

⁵²W.B. Munro, American Influences on Canadian Government (Toronto: The MacMillan Company of Canada, Limited, 1929), pp. 127-128.

⁵³H.G. Otis, "City Manager Movement", National Municipal Review, X (April, 1921), p. 243.

⁵⁴H.G. Otis, "City Manager Movement", X (May, 1921), p. 342.

⁵⁵Crawford, Canadian Municipal Government, p. 169.

⁵⁶Plunkett, Urban Canada, p. 37.

⁵⁷D.A. Young, "Canadian Local Government Development: Some Aspects of the Commissioner and City Manager Forms of Administration", in L.D. Feldman and M.D. Goldrick, eds., Politics and Government in Urban Canada (Toronto: Methuen, 1969), p. 207.

⁵⁸Plunkett, Urban Canada, p. 51.

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 53; Young, "Canadian Local . . .", p. 213; Rowat, Your Local Government, p. 30; and Brittain, Canadian Local Government, p. 64.

⁶⁰Brittain, Canadian Local Government, p. 64.

⁶¹Rowat, Your Local Government, p. 30.

⁶²Plunkett, Urban Canada, pp. 51-52.

⁶³Joyce, Municipal Political Parties, p. 24.

⁶⁴Jack Masson and Robert Gilsdorf, "Studies of Urban Environment: A Political Science Perspective", in R.G. McIntosh and I.E. Housego, eds., Urbanization and Urban Life in Alberta (Edmonton: Alberta Human Resources Research Council, 1970), p. 39.

⁶⁵H.H. Gaetz, "Government, a Question of Business", Public Service Magazine (June, 1909), p. 178.

⁶⁶Quoted in George S. Mooney, "Municipal Government in Canada", paper prepared for the Eighth Inter-American Municipal Congress, San Diego, California, October, 1960, p. 23.

⁶⁷D.E. Blake, "Role Perceptions of Local Decision-Makers", Masters thesis, University of Alberta, 1967, p. 32.

⁶⁸Masson and Gilsdorf, "Studies of . . .", p. 39.

⁶⁹Adrian, "Nonpartisanship", International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York: MacMillan and Free Press), p. 202.

⁷⁰Mooney, "Municipal Government"

⁷¹Joyce, "Municipal Political Parties", p. 15.

⁷²The Edmonton Journal, October 20, 1945. Quoted in G.M. Betts, "The Edmonton Aldermanic Election of 1962", Master's thesis, University of Alberta, 1963, pp. 38-39.

⁷³Kaplan, Regional City, p. 29.

⁷⁴Rowat, Your Local Government, p. 35; and Harold Kaplan, Urban Political Systems: A Functional Analysis of Metro Toronto (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), p. 198.

⁷⁵Plunkett, Urban Canada, p. 118.

⁷⁶Kaplan, Regional City, p. 27.

⁷⁷Joyce, "Municipal Political Parties", p. 9.

⁷⁸Kaplan, "Politics and Policy-Making . . .", p. 550.

⁷⁹H.M. Clokie, Canadian Government and Politics, revised edition (Toronto: Longmans, Green and Company, 1950), p. 252.

⁸⁰Joyce, "Municipal Political Parties", p. 31.

⁸¹Donnelly, Government of Manitoba, pp. 145-146.

⁸²Joyce, "Municipal Political Parties", pp. 31-32.

⁸³Ibid.

⁸⁴Betts, "Edmonton Aldermanic Election", pp. 2-3.

⁸⁵Kaplan, Urban Political Systems, pp. 182-184.

⁸⁶Ibid.

⁸⁷Kaplan, Regional City, p. 26.

⁸⁸Kaplan, Urban Political Systems, pp. 182-184.

⁸⁹Ibid.

⁹⁰Joyce and Hosse, Civic Parties, p. 19.

⁹¹Kaplan, "Politics and Policy-Making . . .", p. 551.

⁹²Joyce and Hosse, Civic Parties, p. 19.

⁹³Ibid., p. 18.

⁹⁴Ibid.

⁹⁵Ibid., p. 32.

⁹⁶Ibid., pp. 36-37.

⁹⁷Ibid., p. 1.

⁹⁸E.P. Fowler and M.D. Goldrick, "The Toronto Election of 1969: Patterns of Partisan and Nonpartisan Balloting", paper presented to the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Winnipeg, Manitoba, June 4, 1970, pp. 4 and 6.

⁹⁹Ibid., p. 7.

¹⁰⁰Ibid., p. 1.

¹⁰¹Joyce and Hosse, Civic Parties, p. 36.

¹⁰²Ibid., p. 35.

¹⁰³Stephen Clarkson, "Barriers to Entry: Introducing Party Activity into Toronto Politics", paper presented at the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Winnipeg, Manitoba, June 4, 1970, p. 5.

¹⁰⁴Fowler and Goldrick, "The Toronto Election . . .", pp. 4 and 6.

¹⁰⁵At a plenary meeting of the N.D.P. Metro Council held in Edmonton in August, 1970, attended by the author, the senior members of the party supported a motion to shelve the question of overt party involvement for the time being.

¹⁰⁶Kaplan's findings on Toronto elections indicate that incumbent local politicians who choose to run again are rarely defeated. See Kaplan, Urban Political Systems, pp. 186-187.

¹⁰⁷Ibid., p. 189.

¹⁰⁸Ibid.

¹⁰⁹Kaplan, Regional City, p. 29.

¹¹⁰Rowat, Your Local Government, p. 35.

¹¹¹Fowler and Goldrick, "The Toronto Elections . . .", p. 9.

¹¹²Interview with Robert Gilsdorf, June, 1970.

¹¹³Masson and Gilsdorf, "Studies of . . .", p. 39; Clokie, Canadian Government, p. 252; Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities, "Nation-Wide Survey on Municipal Voting", 1957.

¹¹⁴Masson and Gilsdorf, "Studies of . . .", p. 39.

¹¹⁵This indication, for example, may be implied in the responses of a sample of Edmonton voters in a 1968 survey--50 percent said they were particularly interested in provincial or federal politics but only 30 percent expressed interest in local affairs. Ibid., p. 39.

¹¹⁶Adrian, "Nonpartisanship", p. 202.

CHAPTER IV

THE CONSEQUENCES OF NONPARTISANSHIP

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter will be to give a brief, critical examination of the hypothesized effects or consequences of nonpartisanship as posited in the literature. The results that are alleged to follow from the elimination of parties has been discussed (largely on the theoretical level)¹ by two groups of writers. The first of these--the reformist strain in the literature--concentrates upon the benefits that they assume will result from nonpartisanship but they conduct virtually no analysis of the city after the removal of parties to determine whether these results have indeed taken place.² The other tradition in the literature--largely the work of political scientists during the past two decades--has consisted of attempts to substantiate empirically some of the hypotheses put forward by the early reformers³ as well as to examine a number of the unintended side-effects of the removal of local parties which the reformers did not foresee.⁴ The hypotheses which will be dealt with in this chapter will be selected from the more recent critics of nonpartisanship.

The hypothesized effects of nonpartisanship, posited both in the writings of the reformers and in the more recent

political science literature, appear to be connected with two interrelated notions in democratic theory--representation and responsibility. Much of the recent literature argues that the implementation of nonpartisanship results in a less "representative" local political system and that nonpartisanship results in a lesser degree of "responsibility" in local government. The succinct argument of Robert Lane, for example, holds that nonpartisanship, by removing the chief agency fostering political involvement of the lower class, results in the "disorientation" of lower-status groups and conversely enhances the power of the higher-status persons. The lower class becomes alienated and frustrated, which in turn reduces its political participation. Civic bodies in nonpartisan jurisdictions thus become dominated by upper-status persons. The lower class is then underrepresented on local councils, and since the participation of this class is reduced by nonpartisanship, civic officials do not need to rely on their votes to gain office and therefore do not feel responsible or accountable to this group.⁵

Although a more intricate notion of responsibility could be explicated, the notion of responsibility (accountability) which constitutes a pervasive theme in the literature on nonpartisanship is used here (as it is in the literature) in its simple sense. Responsibility and accountability are used synonymously. Although local government in Canada and the United States is "responsible" government in the sense that councillors owe their positions to the local electorate and

can be removed from office by that electorate, the term is usually used in connection with individuals or groups within the council. Critics of nonpartisanship usually lament the alleged fact that there is no group within council that can be held collectively responsible for the policies of that body. These writers do not deny the fact that the electorate can remove the entire council, or any individual within it, but they indicate that only very rarely is the majority of council turned out of office by a protest vote⁶ and the contention is that responsibility or accountability is effectively thwarted because the average voter cannot ordinarily identify any individual or group on council with the policy outputs of that body. Charles Adrian claims that "there is no collective responsibility in a nonpartisan body."⁷ Moreover, even the individual candidate who does make definite commitments is not effectively responsible according to Adrian because "his eventual voting behavior can be known to the individual voter only with the greatest difficulty; and under no circumstances need he bear responsibility for the acts of the body to which he belongs."⁸ A similar view was echoed on this side of the border by an alderman of Toronto suburb who stated, "In the heat of election campaigning, municipal candidates often make promises which they know will likely never be implemented. . . . When the next election rolls around, the candidate for re-election will claim he tried to fulfill his . . . election pledges, but was frustrated by Council."⁹

Similarly, although the notion of representation could be given a more intricate meaning, the simple meaning given to it in the literature on nonpartisanship is adopted here. The literature of the recent critics of nonpartisanship simply assumes that on councils where identifiable groups are numerically underrepresented the policies of the council will not fairly reflect the needs or desires of this particular group. Conversely, if an ethnic or occupational groups holds a disproportionate number of council seats relative to its proportion of the urban population, it is said to be over-represented on council. Harold Kaplan, for example, states that "the electoral process often determines whether some group will have better access to the political elite than other groups. By recruiting officials from particular segments of the social system, the elections may decide whose values will be over-represented in the political elite."¹⁰ The writers do not explicitly deal with the possibility that the interests of a group may be represented by a legislator who is not a member of that group.

Perceptual Cues to Voting in Nonpartisan Cities

One of the hypothesized effects of nonpartisanship that has received some documentation in the literature is that nonpartisanship results in the elimination of an important cue-giving agency. Margaret Conway states "the absence of party as an active organization to provide a cue to the alternatives

available may cause voters in nonpartisan elections to seek other voting cues."¹¹ This hypothesis is based upon the assumption that in a partisan election candidates' names are usually associated in the voters' minds with a position on certain issues and the voters, who tend to vote primarily on the basis of issues, will vote for candidates who have taken positions on public matters that they view most favorably.¹² Lacking the cue-giving function of parties in nonpartisan jurisdiction, many persons will opt out of the voting process¹³ or will seek other perceptual cues to guide their vote. In such a situation, a bonus of votes may go to the candidates according to the ethnic connotation of their names, or those who have familiar sounding names; incumbents are more likely to be re-elected and the chances are improved for a candidate whose name appears first on the ballot.¹⁴

Some support for the general hypothesis that nonpartisan elections diminish or remove the cue-giving function provided by political parties is provided by the work of Gerald Pomper and Leon Kamin. Pomper compared the vote in the nonpartisan civic election in Newark with the partisan contest for the state assembly in the same constituency. He found that in the partisan state contest the major cue was provided by the party affiliations of candidates while in the nonpartisan civic election in the same constituency the electorate voted for candidates primarily according to the ethnic connotation of their names.¹⁵ Leon Kamin, who

interviewed Canadian voters for their preferences among fictitious candidates for fictitious office, reported similar results. Candidates' names were varied as to ethnic connotation and position on the ballot. Voters exhibited a marked tendency "to under-choose candidates whose names had 'alien' ethnic connotations or who appeared last on the ballot." When party affiliation was added to the ballot, however, it became the dominant cue and ethnic derivation and position on the ballot had no significant effect.¹⁶

Issues in Nonpartisan Civic Politics

A second hypothesized effect of nonpartisanship is the proposition that "nonpartisanship encourages the avoidance of issues of policy in campaigns."¹⁷ Adrian and others claim that the nonpartisan system does not make campaigning on issues profitable; that nonpartisan candidates seldom take definite, publicized stands on policy matters and that the candidates try to be "all things to all people".¹⁸ Although a considerable amount of evidence is available which tends to support this hypothesis, its impact is diminished by the failure of the researchers to clearly establish whether the avoidance of issues is the result of nonpartisanship per se or the result of at-large type of election which forces candidates to appeal to voters from diverse social groups and from all sections of the city. Moreover, little evidence is presented that issues are any more in evidence in partisan local contests. Generally, evidence is presented for nonpartisan local systems while only

vague generalities about partisan systems are offered.

Nevertheless, evidence of the issueless nature of local politics on both sides of the border is impressive. Adrian, for example, found that in the 1951 election for Detroit council, only two of eighteen candidates campaigned energetically on major issues of the day. Others referred to issues only vaguely, as, for example, "the perpetuation of our way of life", or to "issues" seemingly irrelevant to policy considerations, as in the case of a candidate whose implicit platform consisted of the fact that he had been a professional baseball player.¹⁹ Gerald Pomper noted that in Newark issues were prominent in a partisan state election but in a nonpartisan city election involving the same constituency, "for the most part, candidates did not take definite positions on the issues."²⁰

The issueless nonpartisan campaigns of American suburbs is suggested by Margaret Conway, who notes the failure of the election in a middle class nonpartisan suburb to translate civic problems into campaign issues.²¹ The homogeneity of this and many other suburbs, however, may indicate a consensus on the way in which civic problems are to be handled. Scott Greer and Robert Wood suggest alternative hypotheses for the lack of issues in suburban elections: Greer points out that the small scale of suburban government may result in the trivialization of the political process;²² and Wood suggests that

the substantial power of the professional administration in many suburbs likely removes many matters from public debate.²³ The issueless nature of suburban politics, then, is, in the absence of other evidence, as likely a function of the size of homogeneity of the community or of the council-manager plan as it is of the absence of party politics.

Evidence can also be cited of the lack of issues in the nonpartisan civic politics of Canadian cities. Crawford observes that "most of those in municipal office do not have a programme . . . which they wish to promote."²⁴ In the 1952 campaign in Winnipeg, for example, the candidates did not raise or take positions on some of the seemingly important issues facing the city at that time--questions regarding metropolitan government and slum clearance, for example.²⁵ Kaplan reports that Toronto elections have been characterized by an absence of a comprehensive program on the part of candidates. "The candidates' campaigns are a combination of vague statements about 'progress' along with specific promises about sidewalks and street lights."²⁶

Not only does the literature claim that nonpartisanship results in the avoidance of public positions by candidates on issues in electoral campaigns but the claim is also made that in the legislative arena the elected officials prefer to avoid committing themselves publicly on policy issues. Banfield and Wilson indicate that nonpartisan councillors prefer

not to "rock the boat"; they fear that a strong public stand on controversial measures can produce a voter backlash. "They are much more likely to be turned out of office by a vote against them than a vote for one of their opponents."²⁷

Adrian's study of three middle sized Michigan cities with non-partisan politics led him to the conclusion that "councilmen who do seek to lead place their careers in greater jeopardy than do other councilmen."²⁸

Again, this alleged effect of nonpartisanship is largely speculative since comparisons with partisan systems regarding the degree to which issues are articulated has not been undertaken and apparently no attempt has been made to isolate the effect of nonpartisanship from related reform measures. There is, however, a further claim made in the literature to support the view that partisan local politics involve issues to a greater degree than local politics where parties play no major role. Donald Stokes, for example, suggests that "the diffuse images of parties have discernible issue elements." He maintains that "many . . . people . . . can be shown to have some sort of conception of what the parties . . . contending for power have done in the past and would likely do in the future and these conceptions are of demonstrable importance for electoral choice."²⁹ This view suggests, on the one hand, that the literature dealing with the effects of nonpartisanship does not define the notion of "issues" as precisely as it might and, on the other, it suggests that the proposition

that nonpartisanship tends to diminish the importance of issues, broadly defined, is perhaps better supported than the literature would indicate.

Election of Incumbents in Nonpartisan Cities

The recent literature on nonpartisanship is virtually unanimous in its agreement with the proposition that nonpartisan elections have a greater tendency to result in the re-election of incumbents than is the case in partisan elections. The argument proceeds in this fashion: Since the absence of party has removed the most important cue-giving agency, the voter "casts about" for a familiar name to guide his vote. Since incumbents are generally better known than challengers they receive a bonus of votes which makes their re-election very likely.³⁰ Implicit in this argument is the view that the relative infrequency of incumbent defeat in a nonpartisan system will result in councilmen who feel less accountable to the electorate. While there is ample evidence to support the contention that incumbents are most often returned if they stand for re-election, there is also considerable evidence that incumbents in partisan elections are more likely to be returned.³⁰ This latter evidence would seem to weaken the argument that the rate of re-election of incumbents depends upon the presence or absence of parties in the campaign.

Adrian cites the 1951 Detroit civic election in which "all nine incumbents were returned to office" as evidence of the security of incumbents in nonpartisan elections.³² Since he doesn't provide data on incumbency ratios in partisan cities, however, it is conceivable that incumbents would be

as secure or even more secure in partisan cities. Similar data can be produced for Canadian cities. Kaplan, for example, points out that in Metropolitan Toronto elections between 1953 and 1965, "86 per cent of incumbent Metro councillors seeking re-election were returned to council."³³

The impact of the evidence presented above is lessened (at least for the United States) if one compares nonpartisan incumbency ratios with those of partisan systems. After a review of incumbency ratios in both partisan and nonpartisan legislatures, for example, Kenneth Prewitt concluded that "the frequency with which incumbents are returned to office when seeking re-election is uniformly high for all types of legislatures in the United States."³⁴ A similar conclusion is drawn by Hagensick, who states:

Another alleged result of nonpartisan elections is that the incumbent enjoys an inordinate advantage in campaigns. The theory reads that the lack of party identification enhances the political value of the candidate's name. The electoral performance of incumbents in both partisan and nonpartisan offices in Milwaukee fails to substantiate this hypothesis. . . . (T)here is little difference in the vulnerability of partisan state legislative and nonpartisan local office holders.³⁵

Both Prewitt and Hagensick, however, compare nonpartisan local contests with state partisan elections. It may still be possible that the partisan cities reflect a lower incumbent ratio than nonpartisan civic elections. Only a comparison of the rate of incumbency in local elections will clarify this point--and such comparative studies appear to be wanting in the

literature.³⁶ This evidence, however, does not rule out the possibility that the at-large elections rather than nonpartisanship tend to increase the incumbency rate.

Protest Voting in Nonpartisan Cities

An alleged consequence of nonpartisanship which has appeared in the literature during the past decade is the hypothesis that "nonpartisanship tends to frustrate protest voting".³⁶ Charles Adrian offers the argument that "the electorate, when disgruntled, tends to vote on a party basis", replacing the "in" group with an "out" group. Since there is no collectively identifiable "in" or "out" group in a nonpartisan legislature, the voter is usually unable to fix responsibility for policies he dislikes. Even if there are factions and shifting coalitions within the council, the voter sees the council as a collection of individual names. He cites as evidence the drastic changes in composition that occurred in partisan state legislatures during the depression while in the nonpartisan Minnesota legislature during the same period incumbents continued to enjoy almost automatic re-election.³⁷ Adrian infers from this that protest voting is similarly frustrated in nonpartisan civic jurisdictions but he provides us with no evidence of protest voting in partisan cities.

Banfield and Wilson, however, cite instances of voter protest in nonpartisan communities. "In 1961, this happened in both Detroit and Los Angeles, when the two incumbent mayors,

both backed by almost every group of consequence, were defeated by political 'outsiders', neither of whom were well known before the campaign."³⁸ They suggest that the voters apparently grouped the press, the incumbent politicians, and the business elite together and repudiated them out of "accumulated grievances".³⁹

Banfield and Wilson indicate that protest voting in nonpartisan civic elections does indeed occur when there is "a sufficiently high level of voter discontent."⁴⁰ However, they do not tell us how to determine when discontent is at a "sufficiently high level" to predict a protest vote. Moreover, they do not provide evidence that the majority of these two councils was turned out of office with the mayors--which, it would seem, would have to be established to meet Adrian's definition of a protest vote. The obvious point to be made here is that a precise definition of a "protest vote" is needed.

Summary

In this chapter, an attempt has been made to offer a critical review of the literature dealing with some of the alleged effects of nonpartisanship. The proposition that nonpartisanship removes the important cue-giving agency of party and the implications of this removal were discussed. The hypothesis that nonpartisanship results in an avoidance of issues of policy by candidates and elected councilmen

was similarly treated. The arguments that incumbents are more often re-elected and that protest voting is frustrated under a nonpartisan system were discussed and evaluated. It was indicated that these "effects" of local nonpartisanship are implicitly and, in some cases, explicitly connected to simple notions of responsibility (accountability) and representativeness.⁴⁰ The propositions that were discussed were illustrative of the concerns of the social science literature of the past two decades on the hypothesized effects of local nonpartisanship. The hypotheses dealt with in this chapter were also illustrative of the methodology employed in this body of literature. These methodological weaknesses were also discussed.

FOOTNOTES, CHAPTER IV

¹Gerald Pomper, "Ethnic and Group Voting in Nonpartisan Municipal Elections", Public Opinion Quarterly, XXX (Spring, 1966), p. 79.

²J. Leiper Freeman, "Local Party Systems: Theoretical Considerations and a Case Analysis", American Journal of Sociology, LXIV (November, 1958), p. 282.

³Oliver P. Williams and Charles R. Adrian, "The Insulation of Local Politics Under the Non-Partisan Ballot", American Political Science Review, LIII (December, 1959), pp. 1052-1063.

⁴Pomper, "Ethnic and Group Voting. . . ."

⁵Robert Lane, Political Life (New York: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 269-272. See also Eugene C. Lee, The Politics of Nonpartisanship (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960), pp. 165.

⁶Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 166, 325.

⁷Charles R. Adrian, "Some General Characteristics of Nonpartisan Elections", American Political Science Review, XLVI (September, 1952), p. 775.

⁸Ibid., p. 774.

⁹Peter Silcox, "Everybody's Urban Crises", The Canadian Forum (May, 1969), p. 36.

¹⁰Harold Kaplan, Urban Political Systems: A Functional Analysis of Metro Toronto (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), p. 181.

¹¹Margaret Conway, "Voter Information Sources in a Nonpartisan Local Election", Western Political Quarterly, LXXI (March, 1968), p. 69.

¹²Adrian, "Some General Characteristics . . .", p. 773.

¹³Jack Masson and Robert Gilsdorf, "Studies of the Urban Environment: A Political Science Perspective", in R.G. McIntosh and I.E. Housego, eds., Urbanization and Urban Life in Alberta (Edmonton: Alberta Human Resources Research Council, 1970), p. 41.

¹⁴Pomper, "Ethnic and Group Voting . . .", p. 95.

¹⁵Pomper, "Ethnic and Group Voting"

¹⁶Leon J. Kamin, "Ethnic and Party Affiliations of Candidates as Determinants of Voting", Canadian Journal of Psychology, XII (December, 1958), pp. 205-212.

¹⁷Adrian, "Some General Characteristics . . .", pp. 772-773.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 773 footnote.

²⁰Pomper, "Ethnic and Group Voting . . .", p. 85.

²¹Conway, "Voter Information Sources . . .", p. 73.

²²Cited in Margaret Conway, "Political Participation in a Nonpartisan Local Election", Public Opinion Quarterly, XXXIII (Fall, 1969), p. 430.

²³Robert C. Wood, Suburbia: Its People and Their Politics (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1958), pp. 163-164.

²⁴Kenneth G. Crawford, Canadian Municipal Government (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1954), p. 121.

²⁵W.D. Young, "We Need Party Politics in Civic Government", Macleans, LXXII (September 26, 1959), p. 53.

²⁶Harold Kaplan, The Regional City: Politics and Planning in Metropolitan Areas (Toronto: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 1965), pp. 24-25.

²⁷Banfield and Wilson, City Politics, p. 175.

²⁸Charles R. Adrian, "A Study of Three Communities", Public Administration Review, XVIII (Summer, 1958), p. 208.

²⁹Donald E. Stokes, "Voting", International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York: The Macmillan Company and The Free Press, 1968), p. 393.

³⁰For example, see Adrian, "Some Gneral Characteristics . . .", p. 774; Kaplan, Urban Political Systems, p. 186; and Banfield and Wilson, City Politics, p. 158.

³¹Kenneth Prewitt, "Political Ambitions, Volunteerism, and Electoral Accountability", American Political Science Review, LXIV (March, 1970), pp. 5-17.

³²Adrian, "Some General Characteristics . . .", p. 775.

³³Kaplan, Urban Political Systems, pp. 186-187.

³⁴Prewitt, "Political Ambitions . . .", p. 12. Note that Prewitt does not indicate if the nonpartisan state legislatures are included in the surveys he cites regarding incumbency rates. The samples, however, are so large that the inclusion of these states would not have an appreciable effect.

³⁵A. Clarke Hagensick, "Influences of Partisanship and Incumbency on a Nonpartisan Election System", Western Political Quarterly, XVII (March, 1964), p. 123.

³⁶An exception is a 1962 study by Gilbert and Claque. See Charles E. Gilbert and Christopher Claque, "Electoral Competition and Electoral Systems in Large Cities", Journal of Politics, XXIV (May, 1962), p. 341.

³⁷Adrian, "Some General Characteristics . . .", pp. 773-774. See also, Charles R. Adrian and Charles Press, Governing Urban America, third edition (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968), p. 100.

³⁸Adrian, "Some General Characteristics . . .", pp. 773-774.

³⁹Banfield and Wilson, City Politics, p. 166.

⁴⁰A more complex notion of responsibility or accountability might include the possibility that elected councilmen can

feel responsible to the electorate even if there is no threat of electoral sanctions. Similarly, a more intricate explanation of the notion of representation might include the possibility that a councillor could "represent" the concerns of the low-income group even though he is not himself a member of that group.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The purpose of this chapter is to summarize the material covered up to this point and to suggest avenues for future research. The directions for further research will appear throughout the summary wherever the subject matter being summarized suggests significant deficiencies in the data or methodological weaknesses in the literature. Using this format, the suggested areas for additional research will appear in the context of the literature being reviewed, where their relevance will be more clear.

In the first chapter, the plan of the study was explicated and a conceptual framework was developed within which the literature on nonpartisan civic politics could be discussed. The purpose of the thesis was expressed as an attempt to provide an understanding of local nonpartisan politics in the United States and Canada through a critical review of the literature. The intention was also expressed that the study would concentrate upon a historical and descriptive account of nonpartisanship in these two countries. Nonpartisanship was to be examined at both the ideological and institutional levels. It was stated that data would be presented to provide possible explanations for the existence of partisan

politics in some cities but not others and the existence of different degrees of nonpartisanship in different cities. It was further indicated that a final substantive chapter would be included which would deal with the hypothesized effects of nonpartisan civic politics.

In the first chapter, a typology was developed which divided civic politics into partisan and nonpartisan categories and which also sub-divided the nonpartisan type into "factional" and "nonfactional" categories, depending upon the extent to which specific political party functions were performed. Partisan local politics was said to exist in a system in which an organization puts forth candidates for local office, campaigns publicly on a common policy platform, and forms a majority on council where it exercises a considerable measure of unity in the policy-making process. Nonpartisan civic politics was said to exist in a political system in which not all of these party functions were performed. A local nonpartisan system was designated as "factional" if some, but not all, of these functions were performed. The term "nonfactional" was applied to cities in which no organization overtly put forth candidates, in which there was no group of candidates campaigning on a common program and in which no enduring factions existed on the council. The point was made that nonpartisanship was a matter of degree; it depends upon the degree to which certain party functions are performed. The "factional" category, for example,

would, in degree, approach the partisan category more closely than would the "nonfactional" category.

This typology was developed because it explicated broad categories within which much of the discussion on non-partisanship in the literature took place, either explicitly or implicitly. Moreover, it appeared to provide the "best fit" for conceptualizing the actual political reality in both the United States and Canada. The strength of this typology lies in the fact that it goes beyond the legal definition of nonpartisanship as the absence of party labels from the ballot and in the fact that it bridges the gap between electoral and legislative politics. Adrian's typology, by way of contrast, discusses nonpartisan politics in terms of electoral phenomena but he then goes on to describe the effects of non-partisanship in terms of legislative outputs. The typology used in this study also goes further than the one provided by Kaplan in that it makes the categories more precise--especially concerning legislative phenomena. Kaplan, for example, defines nonpartisanship as the type of politics in which an organization nominates candidates, campaigns on a common program and tries to maintain disciplined voting on council. The typology developed for this study, however, takes into account the fact that it probably makes a great deal of difference if a group elected to council not only tries to maintain bloc voting, but actually succeeds in doing so. Similarly the typology developed in the first chapter provides not only

for the situation in which a cohesive group is elected to council, but it suggests that it makes a great deal of difference if such a group actually forms a majority on council--since the policies of council reflect the majority decision of that body.

There are, however, some problems associated with the typology. It is obvious, for example, that it falls short of being an operational definition of partisanship and nonpartisanship. The typology does not specify, for example, to what exact degree party unity must be maintained by the majority party on council to make the system partisan. To state that a considerable degree of cohesiveness must be maintained if the system is to be categorized as partisan does not tell us precisely what percentage of bloc voting this party must exercise. Moreover, it does not distinguish between cohesive voting on crucial issues as opposed to trivial issues. For example, if the majority party were to maintain disciplined voting on "key" issues (however defined), would this make the system partisan? The problem with introducing this degree of precision into the typology is that it immediately renders it inadequate as a framework for conceptualizing the literature. None of the literature on nonpartisanship discusses the topic in such precise terms and it would seem impossible to categorize the literature into such "water-tight" compartments. Also, such precise definition would present a considerable barrier to research in that a careful

quantification of council voting would have to be undertaken and it is not likely that such data can readily be obtained on many civic governments. However, this point does suggest that future research on nonpartisan politics might profitably operationalize a concept such as cohesive voting in precise quantitative terms if only a few local political systems were compared.

The second chapter dealt with the origin, development and persistence of nonpartisanship in the United States. Both the ideology of nonpartisanship and the institutional arrangements designed to remove parties from local politics were discussed. The factors associated with the persistence of partisan civic politics in some communities but not others were examined through a review of the literature.

Evidence was found in the literature which indicated that such reform devices as the nonpartisan ballot, the at-large election and the council-manager plan contributed significantly to the decline of political party control of American urban government. These anti-party devices at the level of institutions were shown to result from a pervasive anti-party sentiment which is made up of a number of components. The thesis of Robert Wood to the effect that the antipathy of Americans toward political party activity in local affairs stems from the legacy of local autonomy and democracy inherited from their small town forefathers was

examined. Another component of this ideology which is alleged to result from the Jacksonian tenet of government by the 'common man' was suggested. This strain in American thought is alleged to result in a view of parties as an impediment to government by the ordinary citizen. A further component of the ideology of nonpartisanship which was examined in the light of the evidence provided by the literature was the widely-held belief that local government is not political but primarily a matter of administration. This view, it was found, contributes to a belief that political parties are unnecessary or even pernicious at the civic level. An additional sentiment associated with the repudiation of local party politics was the belief that urban political parties serve the narrow, "private regarding" interests of immigrants to the detriment of the interests of the city as a whole.

The fact that political party control has persisted in some American cities but not in others was examined. It was seen that partisan civic politics was associated with such factors as the age of the city, the strength of the Progressive movement in that city in the past, the proportion of immigrants in the city and the presence of significant class or religious cleavages.

Further research on nonpartisanship in the United States might profitably compare effectively partisan cities with effectively nonpartisan cities. Most of the literature

to date recognizes the fact that different kinds of political activity take place beneath the facade of the nonpartisan ballot (as in formally nonpartisan Chicago), but then goes on to categorize cities on the basis of ballot form--thus employing the very definition that the authors admit is inadequate. Doubtless this stems from the fact that all data-gathering agencies lump together in the "nonpartisan" category all those cities which employ nonpartisan ballots but this does not prevent students of politics from looking behind the ballot form to the political reality.

In the third chapter, an attempt was made to account for the "curious paradox" in Canadian political life which is suggested by the fact that partisan politics is the exception in Canadian cities and appears to be frowned upon, while these same people seem to consider party activity at the senior levels of government as necessary and legitimate. Both the nonpartisan ideology and many of the institutional mechanisms of Canadian cities designed to thwart partisan activity have been imported, to a large extent, from the United States.

The antipathy toward local partisanship was found to be a sentiment shared both by Canadians in public office and by the citizen. This sentiment appears to have come to Canada early with the United Empire Loyalists and later with the numerous immigrants from the Progressive stronghold of the American plains states. It also penetrated Canada through the communications between American and Canadian public and

private agencies.

Although Canadian cities had never experienced the tight control of the urban party machine, they nevertheless adopted many of the institutional devices the Americans had designed explicitly to rid their cities of the machine. Such devices as the council-manager plan and the at-large election are examples of these nonpartisan devices. The innovations in the machinery of local government designed to eliminate parties and the anti-party sentiment influenced Canada greatly during the municipal reform period. Ironically, however, there were no parties in Canadian cities to be eliminated. It is probable, however, that this influence served to prevent political parties from entering Canadian civic politics.

This third chapter dealt with the fact that nonpartisanship is a matter of degree in Canadian cities. While some cities are "nonfactional" (that is, candidates run individually on an ad hoc basis but do not coalesce in the electoral or legislative arenas) others are characterized by "factions"--i.e., organizations which structure the elections and sometimes the legislative process but fall short of disciplined majority control. Speculations that factional politics in Canadian cities is associated with a history of radical labor or socialist activity or with a heterogeneous population were examined. Similarly, the trend toward a greater degree of party involvement in Canadian civic politics was associated with the increasing salience of urban problems

and with the ambitions of political party activists.

A number of suggestions can be made regarding directions for further research on civic nonpartisanship in Canada. Of these, two seem to be of greater importance. Firstly, the literature which deals with local politics in Canada is virtually unanimous in attributing nonpartisanship to the influence of the American progressive movement and the American municipal reform movement. This study devotes at least some attention to the possible linkage between local nonpartisanship and the Loyalist influence. Secondly, the literature is full of assertions to the effect that Canadians oppose the entry of political parties into civic affairs. These are surveys and impressionistic evidence that this is the view of the elite--i.e., civic officials and community leaders. However, Robert Gilsdorf's study of Edmonton (as yet unpublished) is apparently the only survey which attempts to tap the views of the urban electorate on the issue. More research of this nature is needed to determine the extent to which the electorate is opposed to the entry of political parties into urban politics.

The final substantive chapter, Chapter IV, dealt with the hypothesized effects of nonpartisanship. Some of the hypotheses posited by the recent social science literature were examined. Specifically, a critical review of the literature dealing with the arguments that (a) nonpartisan

politics removes an important perceptual cue which would normally guide the voter and results in the substitution of other "less desirable" cues, (b) nonpartisanship results in the avoidance of issues of policy in civic politics, (c) nonpartisanship results in greater probability of incumbents being re-elected, and (d) nonpartisan politics frustrates protest voting. All of these alleged effects of nonpartisanship are alleged to produce civic governments which are less representative of various social groups in the community and less accountable to them.

The evidence in the literature which supports these hypotheses is presented and evaluated. The obvious deficiencies in research procedure are pointed out. For example, the literature presents evidence for these claims in nonpartisan cities, but only vague generalities about partisan systems. Secondly, the literature usually does not distinguish clearly between the alleged effects of nonpartisanship and associated reform measures such as the at-large elections. Further comparative studies appear to be called for which would deal with partisan cities as well as nonpartisan ones. Moreover, these studies must control for factors other than the absence of party which could determine the makeup of the council or its policy outputs.

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